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ABSTRACT 
For the first time in the international climate regime, the Paris Agreement 
acknowledges the interconnection of climate action and human rights. In the 
aftermath of the 2019 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) 
“Special Report on Climate Change and Land,” the rights to food and to an adequate 
standard of living appear increasingly imperiled. Thus, the aim of this Article is to 
investigate how access to justice mechanisms in climate change matters help 
blueprint measures supporting the livelihood of smallholder farmers. Through 
comparative international litigation, we analyze the untapped potential of indirectly 
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applying international law in national courts, a process that has occurred in only six 
decisions worldwide, none of which concerned climate-smart agriculture. Having 
selected a program of climate-smart agriculture, we turn to litigation strategies for 
smallholder farmers to access such a program. By supporting climate-smart 
agriculture measures, plaintiffs can bolster both access to justice and the much-
needed decentralized enforcement of international law. 
I. SETTING THE SCENE 
A. Introduction 
Abundant data show that climate change has alarming implications for 
agriculture and food production.1 Climate variability and extremes are responsible 
for ecosystem degradation, increased erosion and salinization of the soil, 
deforestation, and biodiversity loss.2 These factors jeopardize each and every 
dimension of food security and nutrition including food availability, access, 
utilization, and stability.3 The 2018 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(“IPCC”) special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-
industrial levels reveals with high confidence that an increase of 1.5°C above pre-
industrial levels will adversely affect communities dependent on agriculture or 
coastal livelihoods, particularly the least developed countries, and result in smaller 
net reductions in yields of maize, rice, wheat and potentially other cereal crops, 
further exacerbating poverty in certain regions. The 2019 IPCC “Special Report on 
Climate Change and Land” concludes with high confidence that higher demand for 
food, feed, and water—unmatched by technological improvements in agriculture 
yields—result in higher risks of water scarcity in drylands, land degradation, and 
food insecurity.4 This situation calls for urgent action to be undertaken both in terms 
                                                          
 
1 See, e.g., FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE STATE OF FOOD SECURITY AND 
NUTRITION IN THE WORLD: BUILDING CLIMATE RESILIENCE FOR SECURITY AND NUTRITION (2018), 
http://www.fao.org/3/i9553en/i9553en.pdf [hereinafter FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION]. 
2 Id. at 80. 
3 Id. at xiv. 
4 VALERIE MASSON-DELMOTTE ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY 
FOR POLICYMAKERS 9–10 (2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/SR15_SPM_ 
version_report_LR.pdf. See generally ALMUT ARNETH ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE AND LAND (2019), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2019/ 
08/4.-SPM_Approved_Microsite_FINAL.pdf (detailing broadly global challenges resulting from climate 
change). 
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of mitigating greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions—whose expected 2050 levels are 
also likely to make crops less nutritious5—and implementing adaptation measures. 
Asia, home to the majority of the world’s poor, is particularly vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change. With India’s population reaching 1,351,000,0006 
and expected to outstrip China in 2022, the situation is alarming, especially since 
CO2 emissions from energy in India are predicted to double by 2030.7 The Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (“FAO”) reports that in rural India 
longer periods of hot temperature during the agricultural season are leading to lower 
crop yields.8 Moreover, in some areas the increased salinity of the soil is seriously 
affecting crop cycles and production, particularly rice.9 The adverse effects of 
climate change are especially detrimental in areas dominated by small-scale family 
farmers, whose production losses pose a risk to their livelihoods, food security, and 
nutrition.10 From a gender perspective, data from India shows that exposure to 
climate change disasters, generally in the form of floods, has much worse effects on 
girls than boys.11 This has serious consequences in terms of gender equality in 
nutrition, as male children are often prioritized for both food distribution and 
healthcare access.12 
In the Indian Ocean, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands are experiencing severe 
agricultural productivity losses—rice in particular, which constitutes the main staple 
                                                          
 
5 Nicola Davis, Climate Change Will Make Hundreds of Millions More People Nutrient Deficient, THE 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2018/aug/27/climate-change-will-
make-hundreds-of-millions-more-people-nutrient-deficient. 
6 Total Population of India 2024, STATISTA (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/263766/ 
total-population-of-india/. 
7 Agnieska de Sousa et al., What Will the World Eat in the Next Decade?, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 22, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-food-outlook/. CO2 emissions projections are compared with 
2012 levels. See Navroz K. Dubash et al., India’s Energy and Emissions Future: An Interpretive Analysis 
of Model Scenarios, 13 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 9 (2018). 
8 See FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION, supra note 1, at 63. 
9 Bandla Gangaiah et al., Bringing Climatic Resilience to Farming Systems of Andaman & Nicobar 
Islands, in INTEGRATED FARMING SYSTEMS FOR TROPICAL ISLANDS OF INDIA 174, 179 (Bandla Gangaiah 
& Sibnarayan Dam Roy eds., 2016). 
10 FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION, supra note 1, at 64. 
11 Id. at 92. 
12 Id. 
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of the population and its most important crop.13 Such productivity losses are due in 
part to the salinity of the soil induced by climate change.14 A program implemented 
by the Central Island Agricultural Research Institute (“CIARI”) has shown the 
beneficial effects of tackling the salinity problem through the use of salt-resistant 
seeds.15 This program has the potential to benefit other farmers by increasing the 
overall productivity of the islands. However, its successful and fruitful 
implementation in other geographical locations is dependent on governmental action 
and support. One of the most significant results that the program could attain is to 
protect the access to food and ensure adequate standards of living of the Islands’ 
communities in a progressive, long-term manner. The present Article aims to shed 
light on how climate change litigation based on international law could be a possible 
avenue to trigger climate-smart agriculture measures of the type identified in the 
above-mentioned program in order to advance adaptation responses and implement 
mitigation co-benefits. Indeed, climate change litigation has proved to be an effective 
tool to boost climate change policy efforts when and where governments fall short. 
Currently, climate change litigation is growing rapidly, with roughly 1,328 lawsuits 
in thirty-two jurisdictions,16 six of which were explicitly grounded in international 
law.17 To date, none of these cases have been brought with the aim of precipitating 
innovative technology or a program of climate-smart agriculture. To this extent, the 
present Article will add to the current literature exploring new pathways for climate 
change litigation. 
At present, climate change litigation based on international law has mainly 
relied on the provisions of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, the Kyoto Protocol, or principles of international law to interpret national 
law and hold governments accountable when they lack adequate tools for mitigation 
and adaption.18 Although courts have only started applying the Paris Agreement, this 
Article argues that it represents a fertile ground for adaptation-based litigation due 
                                                          
 
13 NARESH KUMAR BAINSLA ET AL., A SOCIAL INTERFACE FOR RICE PRODUCTION IN ANDAMAN AND 
NICOBAR ISLANDS (2014); see also Gangaiah et al., supra note 9, at 175. 
14 BAINSLA ET AL., supra note 13. 
15 P.K. SINGH ET AL., FARMERS’ PARTICIPATORY SEED PRODUCTION AND ADOPTION OF RICE VARIETIES 
IN ANDAMAN & NICOBAR ISLANDS—A SUCCESS STORY (2014), https://www.researchgate.net/ 
publication/291339300_Farmer%27s_participatory_seed_production_adoption_of_rice_varieties_in_A_
N_Islands. 
16 JOANA SETZER & REBECCA BYRNES, GLOBAL TRENDS IN CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: 2019 
SNAPSHOT 3 (2019). The total number includes international regional and national cases. 
17 See infra Part II.A. 
18 See infra Part II.B. 
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to the Agreement’s definition of human rights in its Preamble. This definition entails 
that states must ensure that appropriate adaptation measures are taken to protect and 
fulfill human rights, including the right to food and adequate standards of living 
enshrined in the human rights instruments they have ratified. 
B. Methodology 
Our research adopts a comparative approach, scrutinizing sources of 
international climate change law and human rights instruments as previously applied 
by national courts within various jurisdictions.19 In particular, the investigation looks 
at climate change litigation cases in Australia, Colombia, India, Pakistan, the 
Netherlands, and the United States. The purpose is to show that, where states fail to 
carry out adequate adaptive measures to safeguard the rights to food and adequate 
standards of living, individuals and non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) are 
in a position to invoke international law to increase their odds of successfully 
accessing justice. Hence, states may be held accountable in domestic courts due to 
an indirect application of international law and ordered to adopt adequate measures 
to combat climate change. 
The present Article is premised on a number of assumptions and limitations. 
We focus on the role of international law in facilitating access to justice through legal 
actions brought solely against states, concentrating exclusively on adaptation 
matters. Moreover, the legal actions under examination are those brought by 
individuals and NGOs. In light of this limitation, we will not focus on international 
obligations between countries, such as duties of cooperation. Further, since the 
analysis of all available legal grounds under international conventions and 
instruments would require a separate and extensive analysis, the scope of this Article 
is limited to a restricted number of legal instruments. Finally, we acknowledge that 
litigation is not the only answer to the lack of adequate climate change efforts. 
However, an analysis of approaches outside of the legal field would go beyond the 
purpose of this Article. 
Certain terms that appear in the Article should be clarified. Our use of 
“resilience” in Part II implies three indicators: socio-economic access to food, the 
biophysical capacity to produce food more intensively or extensively, as well as the 
                                                          
 
19 By comparative, we herein refer to comparative international law. See Anthea Roberts, Comparative 
International Law? The Role of the National Courts in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 60 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 57 (2011). For comparative law as a comparative approach, see KONRAD ZWEIGERT 
& HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (Tony Weird trans., Oxford Univ. Press 3d ed. 
1998) (1977). 
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magnitude and diversity of current domestic food production.20 With regard to our 
case study in Part III, “resilience” refers only to the biophysical capacity to intensify 
or increase food production. When denoting “climate-smart agriculture,” we mean 
an approach that aims to achieve food security in the context of a changing climate.21 
This approach seeks to enhance productivity in a sustainable manner, support 
farming communities in their adaptation to climate change by building resilience, 
and, where possible, deliver co-benefits of reduced GHG emissions.22 Climate 
resilient technologies—such as early warning systems, climate insurance, crop 
diversification, and new crop varieties—provide key entry points for climate-smart 
agriculture and contribute to the realization of the rights to food and adequate 
standard of living.23 For instance, our case study casts light on the development of 
new crop varieties. 
The Article will proceed as follows. In the subsequent section (Part II) we 
examine how and which international norms could facilitate access to justice in 
climate change matters to precipitate climate-smart agriculture measures at a national 
level and protect and ensure the right to food and adequate standards of living. The 
third section (Part III) illustrates the program led by CIARI on India’s Nicobar and 
Andaman Islands, presented as an excellent example of the implementation of an 
adaptive measure: the introduction of resilient rice seeds to tackle the soil salinity 
caused by climate change. We further study its beneficial effects in terms of 
increased rice production. Finally, in the fourth section (Part IV) we showcase a 
hypothetical domestic climate change case brought by small landholders of the 
Andaman and Nicobar Islands against India’s governmental authorities based on the 
international norms identified in Part I. 
                                                          
 
20 David Seekell et al., Resilience in the Global Food System, 12 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 2 (2017). 
21 See JANIE RIOUX ET AL., FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, PLANNING, IMPLEMENTING 
AND EVALUATING CLIMATE-SMART AGRICULTURE IN SMALLHOLDER FARMING SYSTEMS, at xi (2016), 
http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5805e.pdf. 
22 Id. (highlighting how crop production can provide an opportunity to mitigate climate change in two 
ways: by storing carbon and by reducing GHG emissions). 
23 Rebecca Clements et al., Technologies for Climate Change Adaptation—Agriculture Sector, in TECH. 
NEEDS ASSESSMENT GUIDEBOOK SERIES 54, 105–06, 108 (Xianli Zhu ed., 2011), https://orbit.dtu.dk/ 
files/5706575/Technologies_for_Climate_Change_Adaptation_Agriculture_sector.pdf. 
 C O M P A R A T I V E  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  L I T I G A T I O N   
 
P A G E  |  5 3 3   
 
 
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2020.717 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 
II. ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN A CHANGING CLIMATE 
A. The Consistent Interpretation of National Law with 
International Obligations 
The role and responsibilities of states in formulating adequate climate change 
policies has been stressed in various fora and, recently, within national courtrooms. 
In the absence of a provision explicitly enshrining access to justice through the 
international climate change regime, individuals and NGOs are increasingly 
dragging states before domestic courts to respond of the perceived failure to 
effectively address the impacts of climate change. Plaintiffs are grounding their 
arguments in national legislation and, more recently, international law, in particular 
the principles of international environmental law as well as customary international 
law and treaty provisions.24 This new type of litigation is characterized by its 
recourse to an interpretive technique that has long been applied by national judicial 
bodies: the indirect application of international law in domestic courts—also known 
as the consistent interpretation of national law according to international obligations, 
or the presumption principle.25 By invoking international law in a national context, 
plaintiffs are in a position to strengthen their access to domestic courts and effective 
remedies—the procedural and substantive prongs of citizens’ access to justice, 
respectively.26 
The practice of indirectly applying international law in climate change matters 
emerged only in 2015, when the District Court of The Hague decided the landmark 
Urgenda case.27 The opinion voiced by some authors is that Urgenda set a precedent 
                                                          
 
24 Esmeralda Colombo, The Quest for Cosmopolitan Justice in Climate Matters, 2 NORDIC ENVTL. L.J. 
25, 27 (2017). 
25 Id.; see, e.g., ANDRÉ NOLLKAEMPER, NATIONAL COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW 139 
(2011) (highlighting an indirect application of international law in national courts). 
26 For the two different levels, see, e.g., Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters art. 9(1)–(4), June 25, 1998, 2161 
U.N.T.S 447 (specifically, Article 9(1)–(3) discuss access to review and administrative and judicial 
procedures, and Article 9(4) discusses access to effective remedies); European Convention on Human 
Rights arts. 6, 13, Apr. 11, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S 221. So far, the role of international law can be framed as 
the one of facilitator, or enhancer, of access to justice. There appears to be no case where access to justice 
was lessened by the indirect application of international law. 
27 ROGER COX, CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION, A CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION 
PRECEDENT: URGENDA FOUNDATION V THE STATE OF THE NETHERLANDS 1 (2015). 
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for future climate change litigation in other jurisdictions.28 In the meantime, five 
decisions adjudicating climate change matters have followed.29 While it is not 
possible to speculate on the reasoning behind such turning point, one consideration 
should be clear: These decisions shall not be taken for granted. In fact, international 
law fails to mandate courts to apply domestic law in light of international law.30 What 
is noticeable is that, irrespective of the existence of an international obligation in this 
sense, national courts have indirectly applied international law.31 This can be 
described as the justiciability through national means of Principle 10 of the Rio 
Declaration.32 In fact, Principle 10 encases all three environmental procedural rights: 
the right to information, participation in decision-making, and access to justice. It is 
access to justice that international law appears to facilitate in national climate change 
cases. Furthermore, one must not overlook the fact that, by indirectly applying 
international law, national courts also contribute to its enforcement.33 In light of this 
premise, we now turn to the international legal norms that can constitute the basis 
for a hypothetical case on climate-smart agriculture. 
                                                          
 
28 Id. at 13; see also Hof’s-Gravenhage 9 oktober 2018, AB 2018, 417 m.nt. GA van der Veen, Ch.W. 
Backes (Staat der Nederlanden/Stichting Urgenda) (Neth.). 
29 Leghari v. Pak., (2015) W.P. No. 25501/2015 (Lahore High Ct.) (Pak.) (applying international 
environmental law principles); Earthlife Afr. Johannesburg v. Minister of Envtl. Affairs 2017 (1) SA 1 
(GNP) (S. Afr.); Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2017); Corte Suprema de Justicia 
[C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], abril 5, 2018, M.P: L. Villabona, Radicacion No. 11001-22-03-000-2018-
00319-00, Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (Colom.); Gloucester Res. Ltd. v Minister for Planning [2019] NSWLEC 
7 (Austl.). 
30 The principle of the supremacy of international law does not make international law supreme at the 
national level, and it does not generally apply within the indirect application of international law in 
domestic courts. See André Nollkaemper, Rethinking the Supremacy of International Law 65–68 (2009) 
(unpublished working paper) (on file with the Amsterdam Center for International Law); see also 
NOLLKAEMPER, supra note 25, at 163. 
31 On non-climate change matters, see, e.g., Gerrit Betlem & André Nollkaemper, Giving Effect to Public 
International Law and European Community Law Before Domestic Courts. A Comparative Analysis of 
the Practice of Consistent Interpretation, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 569, 574 (2003). 
32 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), princ. 10 (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio 
Declaration]. 
33 See, e.g., GEORGES SCELLE, PRÉCIS DE DROIT DES GENS: PRINCIPES ET AYSTÉMATIQUE—PT.2, at 10–
12 (1934); Catherine Redgwell, Access to Environmental Justice, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE AS A HUMAN 
RIGHT 165 (Francesco Francioni ed., 2007). 
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B. Access to Justice through International Legal Norms 
1. Introduction 
This section provides an overview of which international legal norms could be 
invoked in national courts in order to drive climate-smart agricultural programs 
through rights-based litigation.34 This type of legal basis can contribute to and 
expand protections regarding the right to food and adequate standards of living, 
rights greatly impacted by climate change. 
The rights to food and adequate standards of living are recognized in Article 11 
of the International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights 
(“ICESCR”).35 The right to food is defined as the right of every man, woman and 
child to have regular, permanent, and unrestricted access to food, either directly or 
through financial means.36 On the other hand, the right to an adequate standard of 
living encompasses a number of entitlements, including the right to adequate 
housing, adequate food, and safe and clean drinking water and sanitation.37 The right 
to food is therefore a component of the right to an adequate standard of living38 and 
thus contributes to its fulfillment. There is no longer any doubt that violations of the 
right to food and an adequate standard of living may be invoked in front of courts, 
as affirmed by a report of FAO that sheds light on the interconnectedness of the right 
to food and access to justice at the national, regional, and international levels.39 What 
remains to be assessed—and what is the focus of this section—is the extent to which 
the justiciability of the right to food and adequate standards of living may also 
precipitate adaptation measures to tackle impacts of climate change. 
                                                          
 
34 Marc A. R. Zemel, The Rise of Rights-Based Climate Litigation and Germany’s Susceptibility to Suit, 
29 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 484, 486–49 (2018). 
35 G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Dec. 16, 
1966) [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
36 Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: General Comment No. 12, The Right to 
Adequate Food (art. 11), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5, ¶ 6 (1999) [hereinafter The Right to Adequate Food]. 
37 ICESCR, supra note 35, at art. 11(1). 
38 U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS., THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE FOOD: FACTSHEET NO. 34, at 7, 
(2010), http://www.fao.org/3/b358e/b358e.pdf [hereinafter U.N.H.R. FACTSHEET NO. 34]. 
39 CHRISTOPHE GOLAY, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE RIGHT TO FOOD AND 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE: EXAMPLES AT THE NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS (2009), 
http://www.fao.org/3/a-k7286e.pdf. 
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In order to investigate these queries, we first assess whether adaptation 
commitments within the “climate change regime” may serve as a legal benchmark 
to flesh out the duties of states under national law to develop measures for climate-
smart agriculture.40 Second, we review the obligations enshrined in selected 
instruments belonging to the human rights framework. Finally, we scrutinize whether 
the established principles of international law may provide additional legal grounds 
to advance climate-smart measures. 
2. The International Climate Change Regime 
a. Introduction 
We restrain the scope of our inquiry into the climate change regime to 
encompass only the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(“UNFCCC”),41 the Kyoto Protocol (“KP”),42 and the recently adopted Paris 
Agreement (“PA”).43 Notwithstanding their importance, we do not include the 
decisions of the relevant Conference of the Parties (“COP”), which have not reached 
levels of recognition in judicial settings as much as other Conference of the Parties’ 
decisions.44 
b. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change 
Mitigation is certainly more prominent than adaption within the UNFCCC. The 
main objective of the Convention, as laid down in Article 2, is the mitigation of 
                                                          
 
40 Mitigation and adaptation are two strategies of coping with global warming. Mitigation deals with the 
causes of climate change and aims at reducing anthropogenic climate effects through emissions abatement 
or enhancement of carbon sinks. See DANIEL BODANSKY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 
12 (2017). Conversely, adaptation intervenes with regard to the effects of climate change, and the “efforts 
to moderate, cope with, and prepare for the current and anticipated impacts of climate change on human 
and natural systems.” See Michael B. Gerrard, Introduction to THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS 3 (Michael B. Gerrard & Katrina Fischer Kuh eds., 2012). 
41 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 
[hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
42 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 2303 
U.N.T.S. 148 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
43 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of Parties, Paris Agreement on Climate 
Change, Dec. 12, 2015, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 [hereinafter Paris Agreement]. 
44 See Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 309, ¶ 174 (Nov. 25, 2015) (illustrating how the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
characterizes Convention on Biological Diversity consensus decisions as interpretive of the international 
human rights law in issue). 
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climate change effects “to achieve stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in 
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system” rather than adaptation.45 The adaptive capacity of the 
natural environment—mentioned in the second paragraph of Article 2—is conceived 
more as an indicator for determining the extent to which anthropogenic emissions 
have been reduced.46 Interestingly, the objective highlights the potential risk for food 
security by stating that the level of emissions would have to be reduced in a manner 
“to ensure that food production is not threatened.”47 Nestled under one of its 
objectives, food security thus appears as a priority of the UNFCCC. Achieving food 
security entails ensuring physical, social, and economic access to sufficient, safe, and 
nutritious food in order to meet individuals’ dietary needs at all times.48 This is 
particularly important in rural areas, where agricultural workers and small 
landholders are most vulnerable to food insecurity.49 Measures to ensure access to 
sufficient provisions would thus contribute to guaranteeing agricultural workers’ and 
small landholders’ right to food and an adequate standard of living, given the strong 
interdependence between these two rights.50 
Although food security is not featured in any subsequent article of the 
UNFCCC, adaptation is mentioned in several provisions, including those regarding 
agriculture. In imperative terms, Article 4(1)(b) requires all parties to adopt measures 
to “[f]ormulate, implement . . . programmes containing measures to . . . facilitate 
adequate adaptation to climate change.”51 Pursuant to Article 4(1)(e), parties 
“shall . . . develop and elaborate appropriate and integrated plans for coastal zone 
management, water resources and agriculture.”52 
                                                          
 
45 See BODANSKY ET AL., supra note 40, at 500. 
46 Lisa Schipper, Conceptual History of Adaptation in the UNFCCC Process, 15 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY 
& INT’L ENVTL. L. 1, 82 (2006). 
47 UNFCCC, supra note 41, at art. 2. 
48 Chapter 2. Food Security: Concepts and Measurement, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y4671e/y4671e06.htm#fn31 (last visited Feb. 17, 2019). 
49 BEN SAUL ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS. 
COMMENTARY, CASES AND MATERIALS 877 (2014). 
50 See infra Part II.3. 
51 UNFCCC, supra note 41, at art. 4(1). 
52 Id. art. 4(1)(e). 
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The use of the verb “shall” in Article 4 is significant: it creates a legal obligation 
for all parties to develop adaptation policies in relation to agriculture. At the same 
time, the UNFCCC grants states wide discretion in terms of the implementation of 
measures to address climate change both for mitigation and adaptation. This is partly 
due to the nature of the UNFCCC. Due to the nature of the UNFCCC as a framework 
convention, its scope is not to provide a fully-fledged and detailed regulatory regime, 
but rather to set forth the groundwork for reaching decisions and passing regulations 
with a higher degree of detail.53 Moreover, some discretion derives from the premise 
of the provisions on states’ “common but differentiated responsibilities,” as well as 
on “their specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and 
circumstances,” spelled out in the chapeau of Article 4.54 No further reference is 
made to adaptation measures with regard to the agricultural sector, the focus of this 
Article. Notwithstanding, the UNFCCC requires states to “[p]romote and cooperate 
in the development, application and diffusion, including transfer, of technologies, 
practices and processes that control, reduce or prevent anthropogenic emissions of 
greenhouse gases . . . in all relevant sectors, including . . . agriculture.”55 
Finally, Article 3(3)’s precautionary principle makes a general reference to 
adaptation, which demands that states anticipate and prevent environmental damage 
through cost-effective measures that “take into account different socio-economic 
contexts” and are “comprehensive.”56 Cost-effectiveness is certainly an aspect that 
should be carefully considered by states, which may undertake proactive measures 
rather than be caught by surprise and forced to bear the expense of extensive climate 
change damages alongside their ghastly effects on the population. The court in 
Urgenda also stressed concerns of cost-effectiveness, stating that the government’s 
delay in taking adequate measures may have led to greater future costs to meet the 
predetermined emission targets.57 
The recent trend in climate change litigation has showcased a fairly recurrent 
application of the UNFCCC. In most cases, courts have invoked the UNFCCC in 
                                                          
 
53 PATRICIA BIRNIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 357 (3d ed. 2009). 
54 UNFCCC, supra note 41, at art. 4. 
55 Id. art. 4(1)(c). 
56 Id. art. 3(3). Regarding the need to take into consideration cost-effectiveness, see CHRISTINA VOIGT, 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AS A PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: RESOLVING CONFLICTS 
BETWEEN CLIMATE MEASURES AND WTO LAW 64 (2009). 
57 Hof’s-Gravenhage 9 oktober 2018, AB 2018, 417 m.nt. GA van der Veen, Ch.W. Backes (Staat der 
Nederlanden/Stichting Urgenda) (Neth.). 
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order to outline the insufficient efforts of states with regards to mitigation. In 
Urgenda, for example, the court primarily relied on the principles enshrined in the 
UNFCCC to establish that under national tort law the Dutch government had a duty 
towards its citizens to increase its efforts to reduce GHG emissions.58 Moreover, in 
Earthlife59 the High Court of Pretoria ruled that South Africa’s governmental bodies 
should not have granted a permit for the development of a coal-fired power plant 
before ensuring that its climate change-related impacts had been taken into account. 
The court outlawed the permit through its interpretation of national law, namely the 
National Environmental Management Act, consistent with Article 3(3), which spells 
out the precautionary principle, and Article 4(1)(f) of the UNFCCC, which requests 
states to employ, as much as possible, methods such as impact assessments to 
minimize adverse effects on the environment.60 Finally, Gloucester Resources, a 
very recent case brought in front of an Australian court, also applied the UNFCCC 
to deny the approval of a project involving the development of an open-cut coal 
mine.61 The denial was grounded, inter alia, in Australia’s commitments to tackle 
climate change as a party to the UNFCCC, which would be compromised by the 
approval of this project.62 Interestingly, in ruling on the contribution of the project to 
global climate change emissions and its adverse impacts, the Australian judge 
referenced as precedent litigation cases from other domestic courts, including 
Urgenda.63 
One of the most relevant climate cases to date that was based on international 
legal norms and explicitly focused on adaptation was Leghari.64 The court, however, 
did not refer to the UNFCCC’s adaptation commitments in order to establish the 
failure of the government of Pakistan to implement existing regulations on climate 
change matters. The “Green Bench” of the Lahore High Court indirectly applied the 
UNFCCC, basing its decision on the international principles of environmental law, 
such as the principle of sustainable development, and the principle of precaution and 
                                                          
 
58 Id. ¶¶ 42–43. 
59 See generally Earthlife Afr. Johannesburg v. Minister of Envtl. Affairs 2017 (1) SA 1 (GNP) (S. Afr.). 
60 Id. ¶ 83. 
61 Gloucester Res. Ltd. v Minister for Planning [2019] NSWLEC 7 (Austl.). 
62 Id. ¶ 440. 
63 Id. ¶ 521. 
64 Leghari v. Pak., (2015) W.P. No. 25501/2015 (Lahore High Ct.) (Pak.). 
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equity mentioned in Article 3 of the Convention.65 In a similar manner, adaptation 
challenges were addressed in Future Generations, a case concerning the 
deforestation of the Amazonian rainforest in Colombia.66 Echoing Leghari, the 
Supreme Court of Colombia recalled the right to health (Article 12 ICESCR),67 
environmental protections during armed conflicts and hostilities (the Environmental 
Modification Convention and Protocol I additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
Articles 35(3) and 55),68 the 1972 Stockholm Declaration (preambular paragraphs 8 
and 9),69 the Rio Declaration with regard to its sustainable development objective, 
the Rio Forest Principles, the Biodiversity Convention, the UNFCCC, and the Paris 
Agreement when making its decision.70 By indirectly applying the no-harm 
principle, the precautionary principle, intergenerational equity, and the solidarity 
principle (which is reminiscent of the intragenerational equity principle),71 the court 
bestowed legal personhood on the Colombian Amazon. Such recognition is meant to 
benefit the world’s future.72 
Conclusively, national courts have implicitly grounded adaptation measures in 
the UNFCCC, mainly by relying on the principles enshrined in Article 3, which will 
be analyzed later in the Article.73 Nevertheless, we argue that, given its explicit and 
binding formulation, courts are also in a position to shape effective remedies on the 
basis of Article 4, for instance to precipitate climate-smart agriculture measures 
when states fall short. 
                                                          
 
65 Id. ¶ 7. 
66 Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], abril 5, 2018, M.P: L.Villabona, Radicacion No. 
11001-22-03-000-2018-00319-00, Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (Colom.). 
67 ICESCR, supra note 35, at art. 12. 
68 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 35(3), 55, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
69 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment, ¶¶ 8–9, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (June 1972). 
70 Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], abril 5, 2018, M.P: L.Villabona, No. 11001-22-
03-000-2018-00319-00 (Colom.) (p. ¶¶ 22–25) (author’s translation). 
71 Id. ¶¶ 11.1, 13.2–.3. 
72 Id. ¶¶ 13.4–14. 
73 See infra Part II.B.4. 
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c. Kyoto Protocol 
The Kyoto Protocol (“KP”) does not establish new obligations with regard to 
adaptation. Nonetheless, while reiterating the commitments already established 
under the UNFCCC, the KP specifically refers to agriculture.74 The main provision 
concerning adaptation, Article 10, stipulates that all parties shall “[f]ormulate, 
implement . . . and regularly update . . . programmes containing measures to 
facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change.”75 The Article further clarifies that 
such programs should also concern agriculture.76 The same provision shines a 
spotlight on adaptation technologies as key to improve adaptation to climate 
change.77 
Similar to the previous discussion of the UNFCCC, the KP grants states a 
certain degree of discretion based on a qualified version of the principle of Common 
but Differentiated Responsibilities (“CBDR”). In particular, Article 10 subjects 
mitigation and adaption measures to parties’ “common but differentiated 
responsibilities and their specific national and regional development priorities, 
objectives and circumstances.”78 Despite the differentiation between developing and 
developed countries, the formulation of Article 10 is unambiguous enough to place 
a duty on states that are parties to the Protocol to undertake, as much as possible, 
efforts for the development of adequate national adaptation policies. 
In the trajectory of climate change litigation, plaintiffs have brought lawsuits 
under the KP to push for the adoption of measures to limit GHGs and meet adequate 
emission targets. This was for example the case in Urgenda, where the KP and other 
sources of law were used to set a standard for the duty of care existing under national 
law.79 Moreover, the court’s decision in Earthlife explicitly recalled South Africa’s 
obligations arising out of its position as a signatory to the KP.80 Finally, the KP was 
also invoked in Gloucester Resources to stress Australia’s responsibility as a 
                                                          
 
74 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 42, at art. 10(b)(i)–(ii). 
75 Id. art. 10(b). 
76 Id. art. 10(b)(i). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. art. 10. 
79 Hof’s-Gravenhage 9 oktober 2018, AB 2018, 417 m.nt. GA van der Veen, Ch.W. Backes (Staat der 
Nederlanden/Stichting Urgenda) (Neth.). 
80 Earthlife Afr. Johannesburg v. Minister of Envtl. Affairs 2017 (1) SA 1 (GNP) at 14–15 para. 35 (S. 
Afr.). 
 
U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  P I T T S B U R G H  L A W  R E V I E W  
 




ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2020.717 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 
developed country to take the lead in adopting measures to tackle climate change.81 
Interestingly, in none of these cases has the court applied a specific provision of the 
KP, but rather courts have favored a more general reference to the Protocol. 
So far, the KP has not been used as a legal basis for adaptation-related lawsuits. 
Nonetheless, it is not unrealistic to posit that, similar to Urgenda and Earthlife, its 
provisions could be invoked in future adaptation-related suits vis-à-vis countries that 
ratified the Protocol’s second commitment period, which is not yet in force.82 
Moreover, due to its specific reference to adaptation measures in the context of 
agriculture, the KP could be significant in the context of protecting the right to food 
and adequate standards of living as described in Part III. Be that as it may, the Paris 
Agreement may have superseded the KP’s role in litigation and the expectations for 
its further application are therefore limited. 
d. Paris Agreement 
In the Paris Agreement (“PA”), the role of adaptation is significantly enhanced 
when compared to the UNFCCC and KP, as inferred by the significant number of 
provisions referring to it.83 Previously, at a conference held in Cancun, states that are 
parties to the UNFCCC recognized that adaptation ought to be addressed with the 
same priority as mitigation, and enhanced action was required to build resilience in 
developing countries, which are disproportionately affected by climate change.84 In 
light of this backdrop, the PA specifically includes in its objective the need to adapt 
to the adverse effects of climate change and foster resilience in a manner that “does 
not threaten food production” as part of the global response to climate change.85 The 
explicit inclusion of adaptation in its objective—as opposed to the UNFCCC—has 
                                                          
 
81 Gloucester Res. Ltd. v Minister for Planning [2019] NSWLEC 7, ¶ 539 (Austl.). 
82 As of 18 February 2020, 137 countries have ratified the Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period, 
namely the Doha Amendment. The Doha Amendment, UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE, 
https://unfccc.int/process/the-kyoto-protocol/the-doha-amendment (last visited May 5, 2020). Since a 
total of 144 instruments of acceptance are required for its entry into force, the Doha Amendment is now 
seven ratifications away from its entry into force. Id. 
83 See Alexandra Lesnikowski et al., What Does the Paris Agreement Mean for Adaptation?, 17 CLIMATE 
POL’Y 825, 825 (2016). 
84 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of Parties, The Cancun Agreements: 
Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action Under the 
Convention, ¶¶ 2(b), 11, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2011). 
85 Paris Agreement, supra note 43, at art. 2(1)(b). 
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significant consequences in terms of the conduct expected from signatories, which 
must not undermine the purpose of the Agreement. 
The PA’s objective should be read in the light of the Agreement’s Preamble, 
which sets as fundamental priorities the safeguarding of food security and the 
eradication of hunger jointly with the particular vulnerabilities of food production 
systems to the impacts of climate change.86 Albeit not legally binding, the relevance 
of the Preamble clause is recognized in customary international law and will affect 
the interpretation of the operative provisions of the Agreement.87 The role of 
adaptation in the PA is further bolstered by Article 7, which recognizes it as a global 
challenge with multi-level implications—local, subnational, national, regional, and 
international—while elevating it to a long-term goal.88 The “global” goal on 
adaptation is one of “enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and 
reducing vulnerability to climate change”89 with a view toward holding the global 
temperature increase to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and aiming for a 
temperature increase of no more than 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, as set forth 
in Article 2(1).90 To do so, building adaptation is presented as a crucial method in 
the response to climate change, even for mitigation goals.91 Article 7(4) as well as 
Article 4(7) explicitly acknowledge the synergies between adaptation and mitigation 
responses.92 Although the PA fails to outline the integration process for co-benefits 
under its framework, it provides a linchpin from which climate change plaintiffs may 
deploy existing literature on the mitigation co-benefits of adaptation.93 
                                                          
 
86 Id. pmbl. 
87 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(2), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; see Makane 
Moïse Mbengue, Preamble, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L LAW, https://opil.ouplaw.com/ 
view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1456?rskey=C1mju5&result=1&prd 
=OPIL (last updated Sept. 2006); see also Annalisa Savaresi, Climate Change and Human Rights: 
Fragmentation, Interplay and Institutional Linkages, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND CLIMATE GOVERNANCE 32 (Sébastien Duyck et al. eds., 2018). 
88 Paris Agreement, supra note 43, at art. 7(2). 
89 Id. art. 7(1). 
90 Id. 
91 Halldór Thorgeirsson, Objective (Article 2.1), in THE PARIS AGREEMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE: 
ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY 123, 128 (Daniel Klein et al. eds., 2017). 
92 Paris Agreement, supra note 43, at art. 4(7), 7(4). 
93 See Chunli Zhao et. al., Adaptation and Mitigation for Combating Climate Change—From Single to 
Joint, 4 ECOSYSTEM HEALTH & SUSTAINABILITY 85, 85 (2018); see also Diana Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 
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Article 7(2) further emphasizes that adaptation is a key component of the 
response to the adverse effects of climate change—to protect people, livelihoods and 
ecosystems—in particular, taking into account the urgent and immediate needs of 
those developing countries that are most vulnerable to such effects.94 The principles 
underpinning the adaptation actions described in the PA are also of further relevance. 
Adaptation action “should” be “country-driven, gender-responsive, participatory” as 
well as “based on and guided by the best available science.”95 In addition to 
reinforcing adaptation as a key pillar of the climate change framework, the PA sets 
forth a duty for states to engage in adaptation planning processes.96 The use of the 
term “shall” in Article 7(9) endows the provision with a binding character.97 
Discretion may once again soften the implementation of such a duty as states are 
allowed to plan “as appropriate.”98 The provision further allows states leeway in 
deciding the type of adaption planning processes which “may include,” among 
others, “the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans,” 
“formulating nationally determined prioritized action,” and “building the resilience 
of socioeconomic and ecological systems.”99 This provision is nevertheless relevant 
to flesh out at least part of the content of adaptation plans, which the UNFCCC and 
the KP did not cover. More importantly, it sets forth a procedural duty to engage in 
the decision-making and implementation processes to pass adaptation measures. 
Notwithstanding their inclusion in the PA, the adaptation provisions discussed 
so far are limited. While a standard of conduct may be expected from states with 
regard to their mitigation commitments, this has not yet been established for 
adaptation.100 The former must be communicated through Nationally Determined 
Contributions (“NDCs”), which are meant to be progressive and submitted every five 
                                                          
 
Measuring the Co-Benefits of Climate Change Mitigation, 39 ANN. REV. ENV’T & RESOURCES, 549, 556–
57 (2014). 
94 Paris Agreement, supra note 43, at art. 7(2). 
95 Id. art. 7(5). 




100 See Christina Voigt, The Paris Agreement: What Is the Standard of Conduct for Parties?, 26 
QUESTIONS INT’L L. 17, 19 (2016) (explaining how parties are to pursue mitigation measures). 
 
 C O M P A R A T I V E  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  L I T I G A T I O N   
 
P A G E  |  5 4 5   
 
 
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2020.717 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 
years, in addition to reflecting a state’s highest possible ambition.101 Similarly 
binding procedural rules have not been established for adaptation, and there is no 
requirement for either its level of ambition or progression. Article 7(10)–(12) in fact 
does not impose mandatory reporting for adaptation measures, stating that parties 
“should” submit and update periodically a communication regarding adaptation “as 
appropriate.”102 Developing countries’ adaptation efforts are taken into account, 
pursuant to Article 7(14), in the global stocktake.103 
During the 2018 United Nations Climate Change Conference, the parties 
attempted to establish clear rules on how countries should communicate their 
adaptation plans and actions. The adopted guidelines, however, do not have any legal 
weight and merely “encourage” signatories to submit adaptation communications in 
conjunction with, or as a component of, a nationally determined contribution.104 
Further guidance for countries’ communication of adaptation-related information 
will have to be developed by the Adaptation Committee with the support of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change by 2022.105 Other soft provisions of a 
procedural nature that relate to adaptation appear under Article 13(8), according to 
which, in the context of the enhanced transparency framework, states “should” also 
provide information on adaptation and the impacts of climate change “as 
appropriate.”106 The wording does not employ mandatory language similar to Article 
7(10).107 Parties could therefore submit reports on the steps taken to address the 
impacts of climate change on human rights, including food security, but only on a 
voluntary basis. 
                                                          
 
101 Id. at 18, 25. 
102 Paris Agreement, supra note 43, at art. 7(10)–(12). 
103 Id. art. 7(14)(a). 
104 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Further Guidance in Relation to the Adaptation 
Communication, Including, Inter Alia, as a Component of Nationally Determined Contributions, Referred 
to in Article 7, Paragraphs 10 and 11, of the Paris Agreement, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.1 (Mar. 19, 2019) [hereinafter Decision 9/CMA.1]. With regard to the 
agriculture sector, a decision was reached at the United Nations climate conference in November 2017 
establishing the Koronivia joint work to develop and implement new strategies for adaptation and 
mitigation within the agriculture sector. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Decision 
4/CP.23 Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture, 11 U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2017/11/Add.1 (Feb. 8, 2018) 
[hereinafter Koronivia Joint Work]. 
105 Decision 9/CMA.1, supra note 104, at ¶ 15. 
106 Paris Agreement, supra note 43, at art. 13(8). 
107 Compare id., and id. art. 7(10). 
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Like the UNFCCC and the KP, the PA recognizes the role of technology in 
supporting actions on adaptation as well as mitigation. Article 10(1) highlights that 
parties “share a long-term vision on the importance of fully realizing technology 
development and transfer in order to improve resilience to climate change.”108 Such 
a provision, however, does not contain any binding commitment for the use of 
technology, not even best available technology, and is rather goal-oriented, needing 
further defined goals for its implementation. 
A ground-breaking feature of the PA is its reference to human rights in the 
Preamble, which has significant consequences for the interpretation of the whole 
agreement, including the operative adaptation provisions mentioned above.109 The 
Preamble in fact provides that parties should, when taking action to address climate 
change, respect, promote, and consider the obligations they have undertaken under 
ratified human rights treaties or relevant domestic laws.110 However, three objections 
have downsized the importance of this section. First, the specific language aims at 
state actions that address climate change, rather than those that contribute to climate 
change.111 But it should be noted that a UNFCCC provision, Article 4(1)(f), was 
similarly fashioned and in its decision the Earthlife court nonetheless considered 
actions contributing to climate change.112 Second, human rights obligations are set 
as “respect, promote and consider,” rather than “respect, promote and fulfill,” but the 
latter is the mainstream set of obligations that are used for human rights matters.113 
Third, the recital refers to parties’ existing obligations, but what if a particular state 
has not ratified human rights treaties?114 
One way out of this conundrum is to interpret this issue in light of relevant 
human rights instruments such as the ICESCR, in addition to the adaptation 
commitments mentioned in the operative text of the PA.115 This could potentially 
reduce the level of state discretion to decide the priority and ambition of their actions 
                                                          
 
108 Id. art. 10(1). 
109 Id. pmbl. ¶ 11. 
110 Id.; Sébastien Duyck et al., Human Rights and the Paris Agreement’s Implementation Guidelines: 
Opportunities to Develop a Rights-Based Approach, 12 CARBON & CLIMATE REV. 192, 194 (2018). 
111 See BODANSKY ET AL., supra note 40, at 312. But see Duyck et al., supra note 110, at 197–200. 
112 See generally Earthlife Afr. Johannesburg v. Minister of Envtl. Affairs 2017 (1) SA 1 (GNP) (S. Afr.). 
113 See BODANSKY ET. AL., supra note 40, at 228. 
114 Id. 
115 Paris Agreement, supra note 43, at art. 7. 
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to curb the consequences of climate change. Thus, it is possible to predict that a new 
generation of climate change litigation cases involving adaptation and concerning 
human rights such as the right to food and adequate standards of living, will also 
invoke the PA Preamble.116 To date, however, court decisions featuring the 
application of the PA, such as Earthlife, Future Generations and Urgenda’s appeal 
have not made extensive use of the operative provisions of the PA.117 For instance, 
in Urgenda the court referred to the PA to emphasize the global consensus on 
maintaining a global temperature below the 2°C limit as well as states’ obligations 
to draw up climate plans whose ambition levels must increase progressively over 
time.118 Conversely, Gloucester applied the PA’s operative provisions, in particular 
Articles 2(1)(a) and 4(1)–(4).119 Be that as it may, it is still possible for plaintiffs to 
sharpen the normative content of the PA’s provisions in reference to human rights 
and international environmental principles, following the approach of plaintiff 
Pandey in the only climate change lawsuit to emerge, though not yet adjudicated, in 
India.120 
e. Preliminary Conclusions 
It is true that the UNFCCC—and to a lesser extent the KP—still appear to be a 
valid legal basis for adaptation claims regarding the right to food. The PA, however, 
given its greater focus on adaptation and its references to food security and human 
rights, seems to offer even stronger grounds for climate change litigation. This is 
                                                          
 
116 See María Pía Carazo, Contextual Provisions (Preamble and Article 1), in THE PARIS AGREEMENT ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE: ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY 107, 119–20 (Daniel Klein et al. eds., 2017). 
117 In Earthlife, the judgment referred, among others, to the PA provisions on mitigation commitments 
established under Article 4(2). Earthlife 2017 (1) SA 1 (GNP) para. 35. Whereas in Future Generations, 
the court made a generic reference to the PA to establish that the Colombian government failed to 
undertake adequate measures to address the deforestation of the Colombian Amazon. Corte Suprema de 
Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], abril 5, 2018, M.P: L.Villabona, Radicacion No. 11001-22-03-000-
2018-00319-00 (STC 4360-2018) (Colom.). Interestingly, although the decision does not make explicit 
reference to it, the claimants had grounded their suit, inter alia, on the violation of the right to food, as a 
fundamental right threatened by climate change. Id. § 5.6, (Jan. 28, 2018) (Colum.). Gloucester applied 
Articles 2 and 4 of the Paris Agreement. Gloucester Res. Ltd. v Minister for Planning [2019] NSWLEC 
7, ¶ 439 (Austl.). 
118 Hof’s-Gravenhage 9 oktober 2018, AB 2018, 417 m.nt. GA van der Veen, Ch.W. Backes (Staat der 
Nederlanden/Stichting Urgenda) (Neth.). 
119 Gloucester Res. Ltd. NSWLEC 7, ¶¶ 526–27. 
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especially true if such provisions are invoked jointly with national law and other 
international legal norms, namely human rights norms and international 
environmental law principles, and it is to these two types of norms that we turn in 
the following paragraphs. 
3. The Human Rights Framework: A Selection 
a. Introduction 
This section aims to flesh out the cornerstone of human rights law and climate 
change litigation and identify a possible legal strategy to protect and ensure the right 
to food and adequate standards of living. By deploying human rights law in national 
climate change cases, litigants are in a position to enhance their access to justice 
mechanisms, meaning access to courts and effective remedies.121 According to the 
“Report of the former Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the 
Environment,”122 climate change threatens the effective enjoyment of human rights, 
including, among others, the rights to life, health, water, food, and housing.123 In 
particular, environmental degradation, climate change, and unsustainable 
development represent a serious threat to the right to life of present and future 
generations.124 States therefore have a duty to prevent the infringement of human 
rights by preserving the environment and limiting climate change emissions caused 
by public and private actors.125 This follows from their obligations to protect against 
environmental harm in general.126 Moreover, under human rights law, states are 
required to do more than merely refrain from interfering with human rights; they 
                                                          
 
121 On the two prongs of access to justice, see supra Part II.A. 
122 John H. Knox (Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment), Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy 
and Sustainable Environment, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/52, annex (Feb. 1, 2016). 
123 Id.; see also Human Rights Council Res. 29/15, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/29/15, at 2 (July 22, 2015); 
Human Rights Council Res. 26/27, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/27 (July 15, 2014); Human Rights Council 
Res. 25/21, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/25/21 (Apr. 15, 2014); Elchin Amirbayov (Vice-President and 
Rapporteur), Report of the Human Rights Council on Its Tenth Session, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/29 (Nov. 9, 
2009); U.N. High Commissioner, Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights on the Relationship Between Climate Change and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/61 
(Jan. 15, 2009). 
124 Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 36 Article 6: Right to Life, ¶ 62, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/GC/36 (Oct. 30, 2018). 
125 Id. ¶ 15. 
126 Id. ¶ 62. 
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must act diligently to protect human rights from sources of harm,127 as well as 
remedy violations of these rights. This section seeks to prove how litigants might 
interpret duties to address climate change impacts under national law while also 
building on international human rights provisions, in particular the right to food and 
an adequate standard of living. 
b. The International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: The Right to Food and the 
Right to an Adequate Standard of Living 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was the first international 
instrument to recognize that everyone has a right to food, included within the right 
to an adequate standard of living.128 A legally-binding commitment was first 
established by the ICESCR and followed by other sectorial Conventions.129 Echoing 
the Universal Declaration, Article 11 of the ICESCR recognizes a right to an 
adequate standard of living for everyone, which includes a minimum entitlement to 
food, clothing, and housing, as well as the right to the continuous improvement of 
living conditions.130 The General Comment on the right to food rendered by the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”) outlined the right 
to food that was enshrined in the ICESCR as a component of the larger right to an 
adequate standard of living.131 Albeit not legally binding, the General Comments of 
the CESCR are a source for authoritative interpretations of the rights of the 
ICESCR.132 According to this document, the right to food is inextricably linked with 
the enjoyment of other human rights and is entrenched in the concept of human 
                                                          
 
127 UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, at ix (2015), 
http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/climate-change/climate_change_and_human_ 
rights.pdf. 
128 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 27.7.2(a)(iii) (Dec. 10, 1948) 
[hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights]. 
129 The human right to food is also recognized in the Convention on All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women as well as the Convention on the Rights of the Child. See Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Sept. 3, 1981, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, Sept. 2, 1990, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
130 ICESCR, supra note 35, at art. 11.1. 
131 See The Right to Adequate Food, supra note 36. 
132 INT’L DEV. LAW ORG., REALIZING THE RIGHT TO FOOD: LEGAL STRATEGIES AND APPROACHES 18 
(2014), https://www.idlo.int/sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/Realizing%20the%20Right%20to% 
20Food_Legal%20Strategies%20and%20Approaches_full-report_0.pdf [hereinafter IDLO]. 
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dignity.133 States must ensure both the availability and the accessibility of food.134 
The availability of food refers to the ability of individuals to directly feed themselves 
from productive land or other natural resources, or by purchasing food through high 
functioning distribution, processing, and market systems.135 Accessibility refers 
instead to both economic and physical access to food.136 Economic accessibility 
means that an individual must be able to purchase food without compromising other 
basic needs.137 Vulnerable people, especially those who are landless or 
impoverished, may need to be protected through special programs. Physical 
accessibility implies that food must be accessible to all, including vulnerable 
people—young children and the elderly, in particular.138 
The availability and accessibility of food constitute essential elements of an 
individual’s livelihood, comprised of “the capabilities, assets (including both 
material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living.”139 
Although the right to a livelihood has not yet been explicitly recognized at the 
international level as a stand-alone human right, it is referenced in Article 25 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which describes the right to an adequate 
standard of living: “everyone has the right to a standard of living . . . and the right to 
security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or 
other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.”140 
Article 2 of the ICESCR imposes specific obligations that states must 
undertake,141 which are applicable to all the other economic, social, and cultural 
                                                          
 
133 See The Right to Adequate Food, supra note 36, ¶ 4. 
134 Id. ¶ 6. 
135 Id. ¶¶ 8–12. 
136 See IDLO, supra note 132, at 19. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME & INT’L RECOVERY PLATFORM, GUIDANCE NOTE ON RECOVERY: 
LIVELIHOOD 1 (2010), https://www.unisdr.org/files/16771_16771guidancenoteonrecoveryliveliho.pdf. 
140 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 128, art. 25(1). The right to an adequate 
standard of living has further been recognized in the recently adopted UN Declaration for the Rights of 
Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas, which aims at protecting the rights of peasants—
women and men—and improve livelihoods in rural areas. See G.A. Res. 73/165, Declaration on the Rights 
of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas, art. 19 (Dec. 17, 2018). 
141 ICESCR, supra note 35, at art. 2(1). It is worth noting that Article 2 includes on jurisdictional provision, 
thus entailing the possibility that States be subject to extra-territorial obligations. See id. 
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rights, including the right to an adequate standard of living, under which the right to 
food is a component. States must proactively create an environment conducive to 
ensuring that people have access to food. Where there is not adequate access, states 
must provide it directly.142 Further, states should not postpone the distribution of 
food, but undertake steps as expeditiously as possible to improve the ability of 
individuals to gain adequate access to it.143 The lack of the “adequate” access to food 
must be interpreted not only in the light of the present prevailing social, economic, 
and climatic conditions of a country, but also with respect to future and uncertain 
scenarios.144 This approach is in harmony with the principle of precaution, which 
encourages states to look beyond the status quo and anticipate, prevent, or minimize 
the potential threats of climate change.145 
Similar to all other human rights, states are bound by their obligations to 
respect, protect, and fulfill the right to food and an adequate standard of living.146 
This obligation directs states to avoid the implementation of measures that prevent 
individuals from accessing adequate food. Viewed through the lens of climate 
change, the duty to respect requires states to avoid contributing to environmental 
harm through policies that undermine adaptive approaches. Complementarily, the 
obligation to protect aims to ensure that third-parties do not interfere with the 
enjoyment of the right to food. Applied to the impacts of climate change, the duty to 
protect appears to require states to regulate the actions of private individuals who 
contribute to climate change.147 The obligation to fulfill is comprised of the duties to 
facilitate and provide. The former implies that states should proactively engage in 
activities intended to strengthen people’s access to and utilization of resources as a 
                                                          
 
142 FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE RIGHT TO FOOD IN PRACTICE: IMPLEMENTATION 
AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 10, 16 (2006), http://www.fao.org/3/a-ah189e.pdf. 
143 See The Right to Adequate Food, supra note 36, ¶ 14. 
144 Id. ¶ 7; see also CHELSEA SMITH ET AL., QUAKER UNITED NATIONS OFFICE, REALIZING THE RIGHT TO 
FOOD IN AN ERA OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IMPORTANCE OF SMALL-SCALE FARMERS 1, 2 (2015), 
https://quno.org/sites/default/files/resources/Realizing%20the%20right%20to%20food%20in%20an%20
era%20of%20climate%20change.pdf. 
145 See UNFCCC, supra note 41, art. 3(3). 
146 See The Right to Adequate Food, supra note 36, ¶ 14; Asbjørn Eide, The Human Right to Adequate 
Food and Freedom from Hunger, http://www.fao.org/docrep/w9990e/w9990e03.htm (last visited 
Sept. 26, 2018). For more on the relationship between right to food and right to adequate standard of 
living, see U.N.H.R. FACTSHEET NO. 34, supra note 38, at 7. 
147 ELISABETH CAESENS ET AL., COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS INST., CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE RIGHT TO 
FOOD 44 (Heinrich Böll Found. ed., 2009). 
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means to ensure their livelihood, including food security.148 For example, states 
should assist in the development of alternative food sources and take measures to 
guarantee that undernourished people have access to productive resources or means, 
such as land, water, microcredit, and seeds.149 As highlighted in the ICESCR, they 
shall also “improve methods of production . . . of food by making full use of 
technical and scientific knowledge . . . in such a way as to achieve the most efficient 
development and utilization of natural resources.”150 The duty to provide implies that 
whenever an individual or group is unable to enjoy the right to adequate food for 
reasons beyond their control, states are obliged to provide that right.151 An example 
is the case of natural disasters caused by climate change. In such circumstances, in 
order to comply with the duty to fulfill, states must assist in the provision of 
emergency food supplies, safety nets, and social protection provisions.152 
The most common counterargument against a claim based on the direct or 
indirect violation of the right to food—in particular the obligation to fulfill—is a lack 
of sufficient resources, especially when the suit concerns a developing country. 
Resource availability is contemplated in the ICESCR, which provides that a state 
should undertake steps “to the maximum of its available resources” with a view to 
progressively establishing all economic, social, and cultural rights.153 Nonetheless, 
the CESCR states that even where the available resources are demonstrably 
inadequate, the obligation remains for a party to the agreement to strive to ensure the 
widest possible enjoyment of the relevant rights under prevailing circumstances.154 
When states fail in their duties to respect, protect, or fulfill the right to food, they 
must provide victims with access to various judicial remedies including restitution, 
compensation, and the satisfaction or guarantees of non-repetition.155 Accountability 
is an essential element of the right to food as it ensures that states comply with human 
                                                          
 
148 See The Right to Adequate Food, supra note 36, ¶ 15. 
149 GOLAY, supra note 39, at 1, 18. 
150 ICESCR, supra note 35, art. 11(2)(a). 
151 See CAESENS ET AL., supra note 147. 
152 Id. 
153 ICESCR, supra note 35, art. 2. 
154 Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, CESCR General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States 
Parties’ Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the Covenant), ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990) 
[hereinafter CESCR]. 
155 See The Right to Adequate Food, supra note 36, ¶ 32. 
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rights obligations. The obligation to ensure an effective remedy applies to all 
economic, social, and cultural rights and therefore, generally, the right to an adequate 
standard of living.  
Claims brought to establish violations of the human right to food have been 
long debated on the grounds that social, economic, and cultural rights are deemed 
excessively vague, resource-intensive, and subject to available means and 
progressive realization.156 Yet, their justiciability has been confirmed in many cases 
within different jurisdictions and in legal literature.157 Case law from India, South 
Africa and, more recently, Argentina, Colombia, Paraguay, and Switzerland shows 
that courts have provided individuals with a means to obtain remedies for past 
violations, but also proactive measures to fulfill the human right to food.158 At the 
level of international law, the International Court of Justice ruled on Israel’s 
violations, inter alia, the right to an adequate standard of living as a consequence of 
its conduct in the Palestinian territories, ultimately recognizing its justiciability.159 
With regard to literature, empirical theoretical research shows that economic, social, 
and cultural rights are not less “justiciable” than civil and political rights.160 Absent 
an explicit right to an effective remedy under the ICESCR, such recognition of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights161 (“ICCPR”) is valid both for 
civil and political rights, and economic, cultural, and social rights. In fact, it is the 
Preamble to the ICESCR, and the CESCR itself, which emphasize the 
“interdependence and indivisibility” of economic, cultural, and social rights with 
political and civil rights.162 
                                                          
 
156 FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE RIGHT TO FOOD GUIDELINES: INFORMATION 
PAPERS AND CASE STUDIES 86 (2006). 
157 See GOLAY, supra note 39, at 29–30. 
158 Id. at 24–27. 
159 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 134 (July 9). 
160 Christian Courtis, The Right to Food as a Justiciable Right: Challenges and Strategies, in 11 MAX 
PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 317, 337 (Armin Von Bogdandy et al. eds., 2007). With 
respect to both dogmatic and empirical research, see id. With respect to empirical research, see Malcom 
Langford et al., Introduction: From Jurisprudence to Compliance, in SOCIAL RIGHTS JUDGMENTS AND 
THE POLITICS OF COMPLIANCE: MAKING IT STICK 20 (Malcolm Langford et al. eds., 2017). 
161 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
162 ICESCR, supra note 35, pmbl.; Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment 8: The 
Relationship Between Economic Sanctions and Respect for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ¶ 8, 
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1997/8 (Dec. 12, 1997); see also SAUL ET AL., supra note 49, at 164 n.66. On the 
recognition by scholarship of the right to an effective remedy also for violations of economic, social, and 
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While in some of these cases regional and national courts have applied the right 
to food directly, in others the violations of the right to food has been framed as 
violations of other rights.163 These were the right to an adequate standard of living 
of which, as seen previously, the right to food is a component and the right to human 
dignity as well as the right to land consequently proving the interdependency of 
human rights.164 
c. Preliminary Conclusions 
All in all, courts are well placed to interpret the duty to address the impacts of 
climate change under national law through international human rights provisions. 
Human rights law can hammer out climate change claims, which shall be justiciable 
until proven to the contrary. In the interpretation of one Australian judge, equal 
access to justice when climate claims are justiciable is one of the more meaningful 
contributions that courts may make in tackling climate change.165 Furthermore, the 
use of human rights norms to make governments accountable for environmental 
harm, including climate change, is not new. Human rights have been invoked in 
Leghari,166 Urgenda,167 and Future Generations168 to attain two objectives: interpret 
national law and push for adequate mitigation and adaptive measures. Litigants could 
therefore base future claims on the right to food or the right to adequate standards of 
living enshrined in the CESCR, coupled with the human rights provisions found in 
the Preamble of the Paris Agreement. They could further rely on previously-
established human rights that strictly correlate with the right to food, such as the right 
to life. The strategy of relying on the interdependence of human rights could be 
particularly successful in jurisdictions where the right to food is not explicitly 
recognized. 
                                                          
 
cultural rights, see Francesco Francioni, The Right of Access to Justice Under Customary International 
Law, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE AS A HUMAN RIGHT 31 n.16 (Francesco Francioni ed., 2007). 
163 See Courtis, supra note 160, at 328. 
164 Id. 
165 Brian J. Preston, The Contribution of the Courts in Tackling Climate Change, 28 OXFORD J. ENVTL. 
L. 11, 12 (2016). 
166 Leghari v. Pak. (2015) W.P. No. 25501/2015 (Lahore High Ct.) (Pak.). 
167 Hof’s-Gravenhage 9 oktober 2018, AB 2018, 417 m.nt. GA van der Veen, Ch.W. Backes (Staat der 
Nederlanden/Stichting Urgenda) (Neth.). 
168 Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], abril 5, 2018, M.P: L.Villabona, No. 11001-22-
03-000-2018-00319-00 (para. 12) (Colom.). 
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4. International Environmental Law Principles 
a. Introduction 
This section examines whether international environmental law principles 
(“IEL principles”) could support litigation strategies that aim to advance climate-
smart agricultural policies. Admittedly, the precise legal status of IEL principles is 
still unsettled and debated in the literature. Quite unsurprisingly, Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice fails to mention them.169 According to 
Professor Phillipe Sands, some of these principles reflect customary law, while 
others may be conceived as emerging legal obligations.170 Others have a less 
developed legal status.171 Notwithstanding, IEL principles are reflected in 
international agreements, judicial decisions, state practice, and soft law instruments. 
It is argued that they have an interpretative role—laying down parameters which 
affect how courts decide172—and may also function as primary norms in the 
resolution of disputes.173 Principles of international environmental law housed in the 
climate change regime may provide a fertile ground from which to shape the duties 
of states to undertake adequate action—including adaptation measures—to 
anticipate future climate change impacts.174 IEL principles have already been 
invoked by plaintiffs and judges in most of the climate change cases referred to 
throughout this Article.175 This section will, in particular, analyze the principle of 
equity, the principle of precaution, and the principle of sustainable development. 
                                                          
 
169 On debunking the myth on the exhaustiveness of Article 38, see Anthea Roberts & Sandesh 
Sivakumaran, The Theory and Reality of the Sources of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 
passim (Malcom Evans ed., 5th ed. 2018). 
170 PHILIPPE SANDS ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 198 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 4th ed. 2018) (1995). 
171 Id. 
172 Alan E. Boyle, Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law, 48 INT’L & COMP. LAW Q. 
901, 907 (1999). 
173 JORGE E. VIÑUALES & PIERRE-MARIE DUPUY, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 60–61 (2d ed. 
2018). 
174 See Lavanya Rajamani, Rights Based Climate Litigation in the Indian Courts: Potential, Prospects and 
Potential Problems 16 (Ctr. for Policy Research Climate Initiative, Working Paper No. 2013/1). 
175 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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Other international environmental law principles remain outside of the scope of the 
present inquiry, as they are less relevant for the case study in Part IV.176 
b. The Principle of Equity: Intergenerational and 
Intragenerational  
The principle of equity encompasses both intergenerational and 
intragenerational equity. Intergenerational equity calls on states to take into account 
the long-term impacts of their activities for the benefit of present and future 
generations.177 It is premised on the equality of rights across generations in relation 
to the use of natural resources.178 On the other hand, intragenerational equity—a 
relatively new and highly debated concept under international law—addresses 
inequity between people of the same generation179 by ensuring fair access to natural 
resources and a healthy environment. Notably, the principle of CBDR is a 
specification of intragenerational equity.180 Thus, the principle of equity is deeply 
embedded in the climate change regime, either explicitly or indirectly—through 
recurrent references to CBDR—in the UNFCCC,181 KP, and PA. On these grounds, 
national courts have applied the international principle of equity by referring to 
intergenerational equity, intragenerational equity, or CBDR. Indeed, the principle of 
equity—both in its intergenerational and intragenerational forms—provides 
                                                          
 
176 In particular, the no-harm principle will not be dealt in this paper, despite its reference in some court 
decisions as Urgenda. See generally Hof’s-Gravenhage 9 oktober 2018, AB 2018, 417 m.nt. GA van der 
Veen, Ch.W. Backes (Staat der Nederlanden/Stichting Urgenda) (Neth.). This is because the no-harm 
principle mainly applies with respect to inter-state relations. Moreover, the principle of prevention is not 
covered because the principle of precaution better suits the purpose of the case discussed in Part III. See 
infra Part III. 
177 Edith B. Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations and Sustainable Development, 8 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 19, 19 (1992). 
178 Id. at 22. 
179 Dinah Shelton, Equity, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 639, 
642 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007). 
180 Catherine Redgwell, Principles and Emerging Norms in International Law: Intra- and Inter-
Generational Equity, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 185, 186 
(Kevin R. Gray et al. eds., 2016); see also COMM. ON LEGAL PRINCIPLES RELATING TO CLIMATE CHANGE, 
INT’L LAW ASS’N, DECLARATION OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES RELATING TO CLIMATE CHANGE 3 (2014); Brian 
J. Preston, The Role of the Judiciary in Promoting Sustainable Development: The Experience of Asia and 
the Pacific, 9 ASIA PAC. J. ENVTL L. 1, 75 (2009); Shelton, supra note 179, passim. On CBDR as part of 
equity, see SANDS ET AL., supra note 170, at 244. 
181 See UNFCCC, supra note 41, pmbl. ¶ 6; id. arts. 3(1), 4(1); Kyoto Protocol, supra note 42, art. 10; 
Paris Agreement, supra note 43, pmbl. ¶¶ 3, 11; id. arts. 2(2), 4(3). 
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additional grounds to establish the duty of states to address global warming by 
imposing obligations of adaptation and mitigation to tackle climate change. 
In both Urgenda and Leghari, national law was interpreted through the 
international principle of equity. In Urgenda, the court allowed an NGO to invoke it 
procedurally in order to ensure standing for future generations.182 In a different way, 
the court applied the principle of equity in Leghari only with respect to the 
substantive prong of access to justice, namely the shaping of remedies.183 By 
applying the principle of equity as a principle of international law, the court 
recognized the government’s failure to enforce existing climate change laws and 
policies and established a Climate Change Commission in order to trigger and 
streamline the law-enforcement process.184 Reference to equity was made, in a 
substantial manner, in Future Generations where plaintiffs claimed that the 
Colombian government’s inaction was jeopardizing the right to a safe environment 
for present and future generations and impairing the human rights to health, dignity, 
and food.185 In fact, the Colombian Supreme Court ordered the adoption of both 
mitigation and adaptation measures by relying, inter alia, on the intergenerational 
equity principle as well as the principle of solidarity and co-responsibility of the 
Colombian government vis-à-vis all human beings to curb emissions, in other words 
the intragenerational equity principle.186 
Interestingly, intragenerational concerns appear in contexts beyond the climate 
change regime, namely the Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”), and can 
provide further grounds for climate change litigation.187 The CBD calls for the 
promotion and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of 
knowledge, innovations, and practices of indigenous and local communities relevant 
                                                          
 
182 See Hof’s-Gravenhage 9 oktober 2018, AB 2018, 417 m.nt. GA van der Veen, Ch.W. Backes (Staat 
der Nederlanden/Stichting Urgenda) (Neth.). 
183 On this distinction, see FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 1. 
184 See Leghari v. Pak. (2015) W.P. No. 25501/2015 (Lahore High Ct.) 6 (Pak.). 
185 Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], abril 5, 2018, M.P: L.Villabona, No. 11001-22-
03-000-2018-00319-00 (Colom.) (complaint). 
186 Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], abril 5, 2018, M.P: L.Villabona, No. 11001-22-
03-000-2018-00319-00 (Colom.), https://www.escr-net.org/sites/default/files/ caselaw/fallo-corte-
suprema-de-justicia-litigio-cambio-climatico.pdf. 
187 It is also recognized in Principle 5 of the Rio Declaration, but refers only to inter-state relations. See 
Rio Declaration, supra note 32, princ. 5. 
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for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.188 In the context of 
climate change, the CBD can be interpreted as calling on parties to respect the 
traditional knowledge and practices of indigenous and local communities when 
adopting mitigation and adaptation measures, involving such communities in 
decision-making processes and sharing with them the benefits that arise from their 
contributions to mitigate and adapt to climate change.189 
In short, the principle of equity—both intergenerational and 
intragenerational—may also be used to flesh out national duties and precipitate 
adaptive measures to ensure the right to food and adequate standards of living. 
Relying on this principle, whether directly or through the CBDRR and related 
principles, may be especially effective in those areas of the world—and with respect 
to those individuals—most vulnerable to climate change. 
c. The Precautionary Principle  
The precautionary principle is recognized in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration 
which establishes, in mandatory terms, that states shall ensure its wide application 
and that the lack of scientific certainty may not be used as an argument to delay 
carrying out cost-effective measures to prevent environmental damage.190 Despite 
the non-binding character of the Rio Declaration, the precautionary principle has also 
been included in a significant number of international and regional treaties on diverse 
subjects. These include environmental conventions such as the CBD191 and—in the 
context of climate change—the UNFCCC, which urges states “to anticipate, prevent 
or minimize the causes of climate change.”192 Applied to the context of global 
warming it calls, inter alia, for adaptation policies in case of threats of “serious or 
irreversible damage.”193 
                                                          
 
188 Convention on Biological Diversity art. 8(j), June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 [hereinafter CBD]. 
189 Elisa Morgera, No Need to Reinvent the Wheel for a Human Rights-Based Approach to Tackling 
Climate Change: The Contribution of International Biodiversity Law, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 
359, 365 (Erkki J. Hollo et al. eds., 2013). Intragenerational equity enshrined in the climate change regime 
may possibly be invoked in contexts where the inaction of states may aggrieve the standards of living and 
the right to food of the most vulnerable to climate change—for example, rural women. 
190 Rio Declaration, supra note 32, princ. 15. 
191 CBD, supra note 188, pmbl. ¶ 9. 
192 See UNFCCC, supra note 41, art. 3(3). 
193 Id. 
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The precautionary principle applies to risks of serious or irreversible damage 
and uncertainties.194 In the past, the precautionary principle has been invoked in a 
string of judicial cases before the International Court of Justice, including the 
renowned Gabčikovo-Nagymaros dispute.195 However, in this case the court 
refrained from addressing the legal status of the principle, limiting itself to both 
parties’ agreement to rely on it.196 To date, there is no strong consensus on the status 
of such a principle, although it has been argued that there is sufficient evidence of 
state practice to consider it a part of customary law.197 Whether it is viewed as 
customary law or not, the precautionary principle remains a principle of international 
environmental law and as such it may be relied upon by courts.198 
Indeed, courts have not hesitated to apply this principle in climate change cases. 
For instance, in Urgenda, the court found that the Dutch government was in breach 
of its duty of care prescribed under national law, as interpreted in light of IEL 
principles, European Union law, and human rights law.199 The precautionary 
principle, therefore, contributed to a further development of governments’ duty of 
care; in the case of Urgenda, the Dutch government was expected to mitigate the 
emissions causing climate change.200 The fact that some climatic events lurk in the 
lowlands of uncertainty was not a rebuke of the duty to act, but rather a driver of it, 
in the interpretation of the court.201 As previously mentioned, the application of the 
precautionary principle is also epitomized by the Urgenda decision following the 
                                                          
 
194 See Alessandra Arcuri, Reconstructing Precaution, Deconstructing Misconceptions, 21 ETHICS & 
INT’L AFF. 359, 362 (2007). 
195 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, ¶ 97 (Sept. 25). 
196 See SANDS ET AL., supra note 170, at 238. 
197 Id. at 239. 
198 BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 53, at 162–63. 
199 Hof’s-Gravenhage 9 oktober 2018, AB 2018, 417 m.nt. GA van der Veen, Ch.W. Backes (Staat der 
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“economics of precaution” laid out by the IPCC.202 The baseline out of which the 
precautionary remedies were shaped consisted, in fact, of IPCC science.203 
While in Urgenda the precautionary principle was applied exclusively to 
mitigation policies, in Leghari this was applied to adaptation measures.204 In 
Leghari, the court found that the state’s inaction breached the fundamental rights of 
its citizens,205 and pointed to adaptation actions in the water sector, motivated by the 
fact that Pakistan is an agricultural country and water is an essential resource for 
sustained economic growth as well as human survival.206 It further ordered 
adaptation measures in the agricultural sector given that it represents the “life line 
and single largest sector of Pakistan’s economy,” contributing 21% of GDP, 
employing 45% of the labor force, and determining about 70% of export earnings.207 
Similar to Urgenda, the national provisions were interpreted in light of existing 
international environmental principles, including the precautionary principle.208 The 
Leghari case could be applied by analogy to other jurisdictions.209 In particular, small 
islands may also count on the emphasis that Agenda 21 of the Rio Declaration placed 
on the precautionary approach to reduce the risks and effects related to climate 
change, in particular sea-level rise.210 Even assuming that there is no certain evidence 
of the consequences that will occur in the future, states may not invoke the excuse 
of uncertainty to postpone adaption measures that would allow for the alleviation of 
the irreversible impacts of climate change. 
                                                          
 
202 Suryapratim Roy & Edwin Woerdman, Situating Urgenda v. the Netherlands Within Comparative 
Climate Change Litigation, 34 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 165, 180, 186 (2016). 
203 Rb.’s-Gravenhage 24 juni 2015, AB 2015, 336 m.nt GA van der Veen, Ch.W. Backes (Staat der 
Nederlanden/Stichting Urgenda) (Neth.); Hof’s-Gravenhage 9 oktober 2018, AB 2018, 417 m.nt. GA van 
der Veen, Ch.W. Backes (Staat der Nederlanden/Stichting Urgenda). 
204 Rb.’s-Gravenhage, AB 2015 (Staat der Nederlanden/Stichting Urgenda); Leghari v. Pak. (2015) W.P. 
No. 25501/2015 (Lahore High Ct.) (Pak.). 
205 Leghari, 25501/201 WP ¶ 7. 
206 See id. ¶ 3. 
207 Id. ¶ 10. 
208 Id. ¶ 7. 
209 Rajamani, supra note 174, at 15. 
210 Rio Declaration, supra note 32, princ. 21. 
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d. The Principle of Sustainable Development 
Finally, the principle of sustainable development is of crucial importance in 
climate change litigation involving the right to food and adequate standards of living. 
The Brundtland Report defined it as “development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”211 
Since then, the concept has featured in many international instruments, for example 
the Rio Declaration,212 and in international decisions such as Gabčikovo-
Nagymaros213 and Pulp Mills.214 According to some accounts, the principle of 
sustainable development encompasses a host of further principles. Its substantive 
prong includes the integration of environmental protection, social and economic 
development, the sustainable utilization of natural resources, intergenerational and 
intragenerational equity, and the precautionary approach.215 From a procedural 
perspective it encompasses the rights to information, public participation, and access 
to justice.216 What is uncontroverted is that the core of the principle lies in the 
principle of integration, which does not demand a balance between the economic, 
social and environmental pillars, but rather an ecological baseline guaranteeing the 
ecosystem’s functioning.217 
There is wide debate around the legal status of sustainable development under 
international law. It has been argued that while states do not have a legal obligation 
to develop sustainably, sustainable development is conceived of as an objective 
                                                          
 
211 World Comm’n on Env’t Dev., Our Common Future, at 41, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/42/427, annex (1987). 
The UN’s World Commission for Environment and Development, also known as Brundtland Commission 
after the name of its Chair (the Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Brundtland), published the report “Our 
Common Future,” also referred to as the “Brundtland Report” in 1987. Id. The Brundtland Report is 
considered a milestone as it introduced the concept of “sustainable development” and explained how it 
may be achieved. 
212 See, e.g., Rio Declaration, supra note 32, princs. 3, 4. 
213 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, ¶ 140 (Sept. 25). 
214 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 80 (Apr. 20). 
215 Conference of the Int’l Law Ass’n, New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law Relating 
to Sustainable Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.199/8 (Apr. 2, 2002) [hereinafter New Delhi 
Declaration]; Rio Declaration, supra note 32, princs. 3–17. 
216 New Delhi Declaration, supra note 215. 
217 See, e.g., Douglas A. Kyser, Sustainable Development and Private Global Governance, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 2109, 2145 (2005). 
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which all states should strive to achieve.218 To this extent sustainable development 
has been recognized as a principle of customary law.219 Recently, legal doctrine has 
characterized sustainable development as entailing not only obligations of means, 
but also obligations of results.220 
In the context of climate change, such an obligation is formulated in soft law 
terms and clearly appears in Article 3(4) of the UNFCCC, which provides that parties 
“have a right and should promote sustainable development” in their actions to fight 
global warming.221 Similar provisions of the KP embrace this principle222 and the 
recently adopted PA outlines sustainable development concerns.223 For example, the 
PA’s Preamble highlights the “intrinsic relationship that climate change actions 
responses and impact have with equitable access to sustainable development and 
eradication of poverty.”224 Moreover, some provisions call for the Agreement to be 
implemented “in the context of sustainable development.”225 Interestingly, a clear 
link is established between adaptation and sustainable development.226 Pursuant to 
Article 7 of the PA, climate change adaptation will benefit from the sustainable 
management of natural resources.227 
Given the legal status of the sustainable development principle in international 
law and frequent references to it in the international climate regime, we argue that it 
                                                          
 
218 Virginie Barral, Sustainable Development in International Law: Nature and Operation of an Evolutive 
Legal Norm, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 377, 388 (2012); see also BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 53, at 127. 
219 Barral, supra note 218, at 388. 
220 On this most recent interpretation, see VIÑUALES & DUPUY, supra note 173, at 164. On the integration 
principle as an objective, see André Nollkaemper, Three Conceptions of the Integration Principles in 
International Environmental Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INTEGRATION: GREENING SECTOR 
POLICIES IN EUROPE 22, 25–26 (Andrea Lenschow ed., 2002). See also Elisa Morgera, Under the Radar: 
The Role of Fair and Equitable Benefit-Sharing in Protecting and Realizing Human Rights Connected to 
Natural Resources 19 (BENELEX Working Paper No. 12, 2018). 
221 UNFCCC, supra note 41, art. 3(4). 
222 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 42, art. 2. 
223 Francesco Sindico, Paris, Climate Change, and Sustainable Development, 6 CLIMATE L. 130, 131–32 
(2016). 
224 Paris Agreement, supra note 43, pmbl. ¶ 8. 
225 Id. arts. 2(1), 4(1). 
226 Sindico, supra note 223, at 135. 
227 Paris Agreement, supra note 43, art. 7. 
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could be used as a parameter for interpretation228 in climate change cases. 
Admittedly, courts have relied on the international principle of sustainable 
development, as established in the UNFCCC,229 in Urgenda,230 Leghari,231 and 
Gloucester Resources.232 Due to the timing of these rulings, the sustainable 
development principle recognized in the provisions of the PA could not have been 
invoked.233 Nonetheless, in hindsight, it would have certainly offered an additional 
legal basis to ground courts’ decisions to oblige states to increase their efforts in 
addressing the adverse effects of climate change. 
e. Preliminary Conclusions 
In sum, the principles of precaution, equity, and sustainable development—as 
used in the above-mentioned court judgments—may serve as a valid legal basis for 
access to justice and in precipitating climate change-related measures to protect the 
right to food and adequate standards of living. 
III. CLIMATE-SMART AGRICULTURE: A BLUEPRINT FROM THE 
ANDAMAN AND NICOBAR ISLANDS 
The Andaman and Nicobar Islands form an archipelago of 572 islands scattered 
between the Gulf of Bengal and the Andaman Sea, southeast of mainland India.234 
Part of the Union of India, the archipelago features some of the most pristine 
ecosystems in the world.235 The islands’ economy is based predominantly on 
                                                          
 
228 See VOIGT, supra note 56, at 145–93. 
229 UNFCCC, supra note 41, art. 3. 
230 See Hof’s-Gravenhage 9 oktober 2018, AB 2018, 417 m.nt. GA van der Veen, Ch.W. Backes (Staat 
der Nederlanden/Stichting Urgenda) (Neth.). 
231 Leghari v. Pak., (2015) W.P. No. 25501/2015 (Lahore High Ct.) 1, 5 (Pak.). 
232 Gloucester Res. Ltd. v Minister for Planning [2019] NSWLEC 7, ¶¶ 694, 696 (Austl.). 
233 Paris Agreement, supra note 43, pmbl. ¶ 8, arts. 2(1), 4(1), 6(1). 
234 Javed N. Malik et al., Landscape Changes in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (India) After the 
December 2004 Great Sumatra Earthquake and Indian Ocean Tsunami, 22 EARTHQUAKE SPECTRA 43, 
43 (2006). 
235 GOV’T OF INDIA PLANNING COMM’N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON ISLANDS, CORAL REEFS, 
MANGROVES & WETLANDS IN ENVIRONMENT & FORESTS 6 (2007). 
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agriculture, the occupation of most of the residents,236 and tourism.237 Considering a 
population of 380,000 inhabitants, 195,000 tourists visited the archipelago in 2010–
11, including 14,500 international tourists.238 In order to support the food demands 
of both the domestic and tourist population and considering agro-climatic 
conditions,239 rice is the mainstay food crop of the islands.240 
For the purpose of our hypothetical case, we focus on the impacts of climate 
change on the rice farming sector and the access to justice avenues available to 
counter such impacts. After briefly describing the rice farming sector of the 
Andaman and Nicobar Islands, as well as the adaptation challenges posed by soil 
salinity, we identify a program developing rice genotypes that produce high yields 
under salinity conditions. Among the host of rights upheld through such a program 
lie the rights to food and an adequate standard of living for both farmers and the 
population at large. In this case, we solely consider the entitlements of farmers. 
Repurposing some of the barren lands for sustainable use and disseminating climate-
smart agricultural practices across the islands appear to be sensible choices to adapt 
to the effects of climate change, as well as to attain mitigation co-benefits. Moreover, 
such a program offers insights into the instrumentality of technology and innovation 
for coping with adaptation challenges in a developing country like India. As a natural 
continuation of our argument, the section that follows is devoted to the access to 
justice avenues that farmers may deploy in order to precipitate governmental 
measures supporting their participation in the program. 
On the archipelago, annual demands for rice reach 60,000 tons per year, yet 
rice production generates only 22,000 tons per year, mainly due to low 
                                                          
 
236 Deryck O. Lodrick, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/ 
place/Andaman-and-Nicobar-Islands/People (last updated Oct. 5, 2012). 
237 Id.; see also GOV’T OF INDIA PLANNING COMM’N, supra note 235, at 12–15. 
238 Gangaiah et al., supra note 9, at 179. 
239 R.K. Gautam et al., Genetic Improvement of Field Crops for Higher Productivity in A & N Islands, in 
INTEGRATED FARMING SYSTEMS FOR TROPICAL ISLANDS OF INDIA 44, 44 (Bandla Gangaiah & 
Sibnarayan Dam Roy eds., 2014). 
240 Id.; see also R.K. Gautam et al., Identification of Salt Tolerant Varieties Through Farmer’s 
Participation in Andaman & Nicobar Islands, 19 J. ANDAMAN SCI. ASS’N 136, 136 (2014). After India’s 
Supreme Court ordered the wood-based industry to shut down in 2003, there virtually exists no industry, 
hence the salience of agriculture for a living. See S.K. Zamir Ahmed et al., Agricultural Technologies for 
Rural Prosperity of Island Farmers, in INTEGRATED FARMING SYSTEMS FOR TROPICAL ISLANDS OF INDIA 
167, 167 (Bandla Gangaiah & Sibnarayan Dam Roy eds., 2014). 
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productivity.241 At an added cost, rice can be imported from India’s mainland, but 
the islands’ food production system is not sustainable.242 Food security is provided 
for the most vulnerable through subsidized prices under the Public Distribution 
System and the Targeted Public Distribution System.243 These systems, however, 
have been exposed as heavily flawed.244 The question is whether existing land on the 
archipelago can be recovered from non-use, or used more effectively. With regard to 
land liable to be recovered from non-use, existing land in the archipelago lays barren 
due to previous flooding,245 insufficient incentives246 and climate change effects 
including rainfall variation, increasing temperatures and terrain salinity.247 Terrain 
                                                          
 
241 Gautam et al., supra note 239, at 44. 
242 Compare the December 15, 2019 price of 0.10 kg of white rice in Kolkata (4.60 ₹), Delhi (6.41 ₹), and 
the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (7.00 ₹). Compare Food Prices in Kolkata, India, NUMBEO, 
https://www.numbeo.com/food-prices/in/Kolkata, with Food Prices in Delhi, India, NUMBEO, 
https://www.numbeo.com/food-prices/in/Delhi, and Food Prices in Andaman Islands, India, NUMBEO, 
https://www.numbeo.com/food-prices/in/Andaman-Islands. 
243 See Introduction: Public Distribution, MINISTRY OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, FOOD & PUB. DISTRIB., 
https://dfpd.gov.in/pd-Introduction.htm (last updated Sept. 30, 2019) (discussing the Public Distribution 
System and the Targeted Public Distribution System). The system is jointly managed by the central and 
state governments through “fair price shops.” Poorvi Chitalkar & Varun Gauri, India: Compliance with 
Orders on the Right to Food, in SOCIAL RIGHTS JUDGEMENTS AND THE POLITICS OF COMPLIANCE: 
MAKING IT STICK 288, 291 (Malcolm Langford et al. eds., 2019). 
244 Chitalkar & Gauri, supra note 243, at 291. 
245 The islands suffered from a swarm of aftershocks ensuing the great megathrust earthquake that 
occurred on December 26, 2004, with its epicenter west of Sumatra. Malik et al., supra note 234, at 47; 
see also Gautam et al., supra note 240, at 136. The earthquake’s magnitude measured 9.4 on Richter scale 
and worsened the condition of the archipelago soil. See Akshaya Nayak et al., Post Tsunami Changes in 
Soil Properties of Andaman Islands, India, 170 ENVTL. MONITORING & ASSESSMENT 185, 185–86, 192 
(2010). Besides the toll of human life, there appears to occur ongoing postseismic slip of the islands, in 
particular a subsidence along the eastern side. See P.C. Bandopadhyay & Andrew Carter, Introduction to 
the Geology and Geomorphology of the Andaman-Nicobar Islands, in THE ANDAMAN-NICOBAR 
ACCRETIONARY RIDGE: GEOLOGY, TECTONICS AND HAZARDS 9–18 (P.C. Bandopadhyay & Andrew 
Carter eds., 2017); see also John Paul et al., Andaman Postseismic Deformation Observations: Still 
Slipping After All These Years?, 102 BULL. SEISMOLOGICAL SOC’Y AMERICA 343, 343 (2012). 
246 Bina Agarwal & Ankush Agrawal, Do Farmers Really Like Farming? Indian Farmers in Transition, 
45 OXFORD DEV. STUD. 460, passim (2017). 
247 Gangaiah et al., supra note 9, at 174. With regard to rainfall variation, the archipelago has experienced 
significant fluctuations both annual and monthly. Id. at 175. Similarly, the monsoon season has been 
delayed by one week both on the archipelago and the island. Id.; see also A. Velmurugan et al., Climate 
Change & Nicobar Islands: Impacts and Adaptation Strategies, 20 J. ANDAMAN SCI. ASS’N 7, 12 (2015). 
With regard to temperature increase, in the last decade (approximately 2005–15), the mean temperature 
of the archipelago capital, Port Blair, has increased by over 0.60° C, with wide fluctuations in maximum 
temperature from year to year. Id. at 7, 13; see also Gangaiah et al., supra note 9, at 175. Further challenges 
to crop yield are also found in insufficient surface water storage structures, and poor ground water quality. 
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salinity also affects land that has been devoted to agricultural rice production.248 
Land affected by salinity is known as degraded land249 in that high levels of salt are 
coupled with a decrease in crop yields.250 By focusing on terrain salinity,251 we 
identified a program developing rice genotypes that produce high yields under 
salinity conditions. 
The program was set in motion in 2006 by the Central Island Agricultural 
Research Institute (“CIARI”) in Port Blair, the capital city of the Andaman and 
Nicobar Islands.252 CIARI is a publicly-funded research institute established by the 
Indian Council of Agricultural Research (“ICAR”).253 Between 2009–13, a set of 
seven salt-tolerant varieties of rice seeds were first produced by CIARI.254 These 
seeds are referred to as “nucleus seeds,” as they are 100% physically and genetically 
pure.255 In the period between 2010–13, CIARI achieved two goals. First, it was able 
to propagate its nucleus seeds into eleven rice varieties called “breeder seeds” on 
CIARI premises, maintaining 100% physical and genetic purity.256 Secondly, it 
engaged twenty “progressive” local farmers from twelve villages as producers of 
seeds for further distribution: “truthfully labelled seeds.”257 The technology transfer 
was guided and supervised by a team of breeders, entomologists, pathologists, and 
                                                          
 
Id. at 174; see also J.C. Dagar et al., Climate Change vis-a-vis Saline Agriculture: Impact and Adaptation 
Strategies, in INNOVATIVE SALINE AGRICULTURE 5, 21 (J.C. Dagar et al. eds., 2016). 
248 Subhasis Mandal et al., Land Shaping Models for Enhancing Agricultural Productivity in Salt Affected 
Coastal Areas of West Bengal—An Economic Analysis, 68 INDIAN J. AGRIC. ECON. 389, 391 (2013). 
249 Id. 
250 TIM G. BENTON ET AL., GLOB. FOOD SEC., ENVIRONMENTAL TIPPING POINTS AND FOOD SYSTEM 
DYNAMICS: MAIN REPORT 9 (2017), https://www.foodsecurity.ac.uk/publications/environmental-tipping-
points-food-system-dynamics-main-report.pdf (recalling that “salting the earth” constituted a custom to 
permanently destroy an enemy in ancient times). 
251 The performance of rice crops is impacted by a host of factors, besides soil salinity, such as rainfall. 
Gautam et al., supra note 239; Gangaiah et al., supra note 9, at 174. Rainfall decreases the degree of soil 
salinity. See id. On wetlands in India, see Malik et al., supra note 234, at 73. 
252 SINGH ET AL., supra note 15, at 2. 
253 About the Institute, ICAR-CENT. ISLAND AGRIC. RESEARCH INST., https://ciari.icar.gov.in/ (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2019). 
254 SINGH ET AL., supra note 15, at 3. 
255 Id. at 3–4. This is a case of traditional breeding, with no seed-terminator technology. 
256 Id. at 5. On the selection of these seeds, see Gautam et al., supra note 240, at 140. 
257 SINGH ET AL., supra note 15, at 6. 
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social scientists, with field support provided by a local office of the National Bank 
of Agriculture and Rural Development.258 A total of 177 farmers, men and women, 
participated in the field days conducted under the program.259 Once production 
ended, CIARI purchased the seeds from the farmers, and cleaned, packed and sold 
them back to the farmers at a nominal price, thus creating a “buyback system.”260 A 
number of frontline demonstrations were conducted from 2010 until 2014 in 112 
villages.261 Findings have shown the superiority of the new high-yield varieties of 
rice compared to local varieties,262 with an increase in yield of 31.25% in comparison 
with the traditional low-yielding rice varieties on the island.263 The resulting 
economic return was on average 38.46% higher per hectare. The program was named 
the Seed Program,264 hereinafter referred to as the “program” or the “resilient seed 
program.” 
This program led to multiple benefits. First, the entrenched participatory mode 
reinforced the “confidence level” of farmers, who could assess the higher yield in 
their own fields.265 Farmers were trained in sustainable seed production for long-
term impacts in view of not only being part of the program but also more general 
sustainability training.266 A total of 468 farmers were trained for program 
participation,267 talks were held on TV and the radio268 and a “total of 11.85 tons of 
truthfully labelled seeds” were distributed to the islands’ farmers between 2011 and 
2015 with subsequent higher return in terms of yield and profits.269 A total of 20.3 
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259 Id. at 10. 
260 Id. at 8, 10. 
261 Id. at 12–14. 
262 Id. at 14. 
263 Id. at 19. 
264 Id. at 3. Provided the relevant data provided supra, the percentage was derived by the authors through 
a simple equation. 
265 Id. at 19. 
266 Id. at 20. 
267 Id. at 9. 
268 Id. at 10. 
269 P.K. Singh et al., Quality Seed Production, Dissemination and Impact of High Yielding Varieties of 
Rice in Andaman and Nicobar Islands, in DECADE OF ICAR SEED PROJECT: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 
390, 391 (S. Rajendra Prasad et al. eds., 2015). 
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tons of seeds were produced across villages.270 The spread of the program is also 
partially dependent on farmers’ confidence, as some farmers have become Seed 
Ambassadors in order to testify to the benefits of the program.271 Nonetheless, 
farmers still made use of their own seeds by “a substantial proportion.”272 Through 
the program, the rate of replacement of seeds increased from 1.5% to 5.3%,273 yet 
such an increase has not been deemed sufficient to substantially substitute rice seeds 
on the island in order to cope with the salinity conditions of the soil.274 The CIARI 
scientists involved in the project have pointed to the role of governmental authorities, 
in particular the Directorate of Agriculture, who are necessary to the process; they 
receive the breeder seeds from CIARI, multiply them at their farms and distribute 
them to the farmers.275 We turn to the role of governmental authorities in the next 
section, which is devoted to the justice avenues that the farmers of the Andaman and 
Nicobar islands may access, supported by international law. 
The program we describe is best referred to as climate-smart agriculture, a 
concept we introduced in Part I.B. In fact, in the areas where it was implemented, 
the program was able to transform and reorient the agricultural system to sustainably 
“support food security under the new realities of climate change.”276 It thus increased 
resilience, meaning the biophysical capacity to intensify or increase food 
production,277 and reduced the GHGs emitted during the transport of imported rice 
to supplement that produced on the archipelago. It further enhanced other 
development goals such as adequate standards of living for farmers, who increased 
their economic return.278 In particular, the program appears to comport with one of 
the adaptation strategies recommended for the archipelago: the modification of 
                                                          
 
270 Zamir Ahmed et al., supra note 240, at 169. 
271 SINGH ET AL., supra note 15, at 20. 




276 Leslie Lipper et al., Climate-Smart Agriculture for Food Security, 4 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 1068, 
1068 (2014). 
277 See supra Part I.B. on the three indicators of resilience in food production systems. 
278 See FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, CLIMATE-SMART AGRICULTURE SOURCEBOOK 
548 (2013) (discussing such criteria as part of the definition of smart agriculture). 
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existing agricultural systems and the possibility to harness mitigation co-benefits,279 
especially when this is attained by encouraging the active participation of local 
communities.280 
The program is a success story and represents best practices. And yet, as with 
all adaptation measures, the success story does not imply that increasing salinity 
should be met solely with coping mechanisms, rather than substantially decreased 
GHG emissions. Failing to mitigate emissions is likely to lead to increased salinity 
conditions in the soil that may hinder the high yield assured by the program’s 
seeds.281 In fact, climate change will keep raising the salinity of the soil: it increases 
the temperature of both atmosphere and soil, leading to higher evaporation of water, 
which moves salt toward the surface layers.282 Moreover, higher yields under saline 
conditions is not the only feature that farmers wish to achieve.283 They also desire a 
certain appearance, facility in the cutting process, high quality grains, and the 
decreased attraction of insects.284 Furthermore, the program is illustrative of one 
possible intervention, whereas other climate resilience schemes for the islands’ 
farming community have already been pointed out.285 
Assessment of the viability of seeds can be based on criteria beyond yield and 
profit, and the program itself engages with sustainability training for farmers. One 
can envisage other eco-agricultural features: for instance, specific techniques of farm 
pond and paddy-cum-fish models that have proved effective for the resilience of 
coastal areas against increased salinity.286 More generally, it is recognized that 
adaptation programs thrive in what we would call an “ecosystem” of reforms 
involving, for example, water management and land use techniques.287 Biodiversity 
protections should also be part of this ecosystem of reforms, grounded in local and 
                                                          
 
279 Velmurugan et al., supra note 247, at 16. 
280 Id. at 16–17. 
281 Gangaiah et al., supra note 9, at 179. 
282 Id. 
283 SINGH ET AL., supra note 15, at 5; see also Gautam et al., supra note 240, at 140 (discussing the 
selection of these seeds). 
284 Gautam et al., supra note 240, at 139. 
285 Gangaiah et al., supra note 9, at 175. 
286 Mandal et al., supra note 248, at 391. Yet, socio-economic constraints such as land configuration, soil 
quality, and financial incentives should also be taken into account. See id. at 397–401. 
287 For such techniques, see BENTON ET AL., supra note 250, at 9. 
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indigenous knowledge and participation.288 Under no circumstances shall 
deforestation be encouraged, nor should the rich forestry of the islands be violated. 
The overall effects of integrating all these processes into one framework (integrated 
management) can be assessed by systems dynamics models,289 which “reveal the 
dynamic changes, feedback, delay and other processes of a system” in terms of 
quantifiability and controllability.290 
Arguably, it is not necessarily wise to encourage rice crops from a climate 
change perspective as they may not be suited to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands’ 
ecosystems,291 and because rice paddies themselves have been deemed a source of 
methane, a greenhouse gas, for many years.292 From a litigation perspective, 
however, it is improper to tentatively trigger a change in agricultural production and 
food consumption by failing to optimize the rice farming sector. Rather, policies 
creating and encouraging carbon sinks, for example through the growth of 
mangroves, may compensate for the externalities produced on the climate system by 
rice paddies. Nonetheless, it is still wise to suggest agricultural diversification when 
feasible.293 The involvement of women farmers was stressed, yet no specific data 
were found on the actual number of women involved. Hence, the gender-inclusive 
component of the program can be boosted, given the key role played by women in 
the agricultural sector.294 
Notwithstanding the possibility of its integration with further sustainability 
features, the program described has sustainably increased productivity by 31.25% in 
comparison with the traditional low-yielding rice varieties of the Andaman and 
                                                          
 
288 Such consideration is germane to Community Biodiversity Management, “a methodology for 
promoting conservation and the sustainable utilization of biodiversity at local level, with an emphasis on 
agrobiodiversity or plant genetic resources.” Pratap Shretha et al., Community Biodiversity Management: 
Defined and Contextualized, in COMMUNITY BIODIVERSITY MANAGEMENT PROMOTING RESILIENCE AND 
THE CONSERVATION OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES 19, 19 (Walter Simon de Boef et al. eds., 2013). 
289 Fu Jia Li et al., A System Dynamics Model For Analyzing The Eco-Agriculture System With Policy 
Recommendations, 227 ECOLOGICAL MODELLING 34, 34 (2012). 
290 Id. at 35. 
291 Malik et al., supra note 234, at 12. Settlers have come to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands from India’s 
mainland and have brought over crops and practices that are “not wholly suited” to the islands’ 
ecosystems. Id. 
292 K. Minami & H.U. Neue, Rice Paddies as a Methane Source, 27 CLIMATIC CHANGE 13, 13 (1994). 
293 Velmurugan et al., supra note 247, at 16. 
294 WORLD BANK ET AL., GENDER IN CLIMATE-SMART AGRICULTURE 1 (2015). 
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Nicobar Islands.295 Moreover, it has made possible a roughly 38.46% higher 
economic return per hectare.296 In light of these benefits, the program allows for a 
greater attainment of the right to food and the right to adequate standards of living 
for farmers on the archipelago. Moreover, it is instrumental to a non-chemical 
approach to agriculture.297 Allowing for salinity-resistant seeds, the program has also 
offered an opportunity for farmers to adapt their crops to climate change and increase 
their overall resilience. The program would also curb emissions, thus mitigating 
greenhouse gases by decreasing the pollution generated by the importation of rice 
from India’s mainland to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Such higher attainment 
is likely to occur, however, only when the program increases through public 
involvement. In view of this, we now showcase the instruments offered by 
international and national law in order to investigate what avenues are open to 
farmers who wish to secure access to justice mechanisms on the Andaman and 
Nicobar Islands. 
IV. ACCESSING CLIMATE-SMART AGRICULTURE THROUGH 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CASE STUDY 
A. Introduction 
Among the challenges posed by climate change adaptation, communities on the 
archipelago of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands are most affected by terrain 
salinity.298 In order to address this challenge, we consider a hypothetical case that the 
smallholder farmers of the archipelago, or representative NGOs, can bring against 
the appropriate governmental authorities to increase the diffusion of best practices 
for resilient rice production. At present, we identify such best practices in the 
resilient-seed program previously illustrated.299 In the hypothetical case, petitioners 
would ask the court to mandate that governmental authorities expand the program 
into other areas of the archipelago, and maintain it where it is present. Such an 
administrative action would be coupled by the scientific assistance of CIARI, the 
                                                          
 
295 SINGH ET AL., supra note 15, at 19. 
296 Id. Provided the source data, the percentage was derived by the authors through a simple equation. 
297 See R.K. Gautam et al., Genetic Improvement of Rice for Higher Productivity and Adaption to Climate 
Change in Andaman & Nicobar Islands, India—An Overview, in CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTION AND 
BIODIVERSITY: ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 1 (Andaman Sci. Ass’n 
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298 See supra Part III. 
299 See supra Part III. 
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research institute that started the program. We refer to the hypothetical case as the 
“case study.” 
The need for the case study emerges from the low-yield rice seeds currently 
used on the archipelago300 and the lack of sufficient action on the part of 
governmental authorities.301 India’s government approved the National Action Plan 
on Climate Change (“NAPCC”) in 2008.302 However, two shortcomings are apparent 
in the NAPCC. First, it merely constitutes a policy or administrative scheme. Second, 
though a policy, it could in principle contribute to agricultural resilience under the 
national mission for sustainable agriculture and strategic knowledge to combat 
climate change,303 yet, it has so far failed to do so. The NAPCC national mission on 
sustainable agriculture mentions the development of crop varieties, but includes only 
drought- and pest-resistant varieties,304 whereas one of the most pressing challenges 
for food security and the livelihood of farmers on the archipelago is posed by soil 
salinity.305 Moreover, the government is struggling to spend the funds allocated for 
this national mission.306 With regard to the strategic knowledge to combat climate 
change, the NAPCC sheds light on the need to improve the understanding of 
ecosystem responses.307 Still, it does not mention the research undertaken on resilient 
agricultural systems by state-funded research institutes, such as CIARI, which 
developed the resilient-seed program in the context of the archipelago’s 
ecosystems.308 A further drive for the case study emerges from the fact that climate 
                                                          
 
300 See supra Part III. 
301 See supra Part III. 
302 See generally PRIME MINISTER’S COUNCIL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GOV’T OF INDIA, NATIONAL ACTION 
PLAN ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2008). 
303 See id. at 35–36. 
304 Id. at 35. 
305 See Velmurugan et al., supra note 247, at 12. 
306 Vijeta Rattani et al., India’s National Action Plan on Climate Change Needs Desperate Repair, DOWN 
TO EARTH (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/climate-change/india-s-national-action-
plan-on-climate-change-needs-desperate-repair-61884. 
307 PRIME MINISTER’S COUNCIL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 302, at 36. 
308 See supra Part III. 
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change litigation has not yet reaped the fruits of climate-smart agriculture, even 
though climate change litigation has emerged in India.309 
The present Part is premised on a number of assumptions and limitations. First, 
the best practices that we identify are just some of the possible climate-smart 
agriculture measures to help communities adapt to climate change. As we discussed 
previously, the program is not immune to some caveats.310 Second, the resilient-seed 
program that is requested through litigation mirrors the experimentation already 
undertaken by CIARI on the archipelago, yet three further conditions should be either 
introduced, or clarified. Given the methane emissions of rice production, the 
resilient-seed program should be accompanied by the creation of carbon sinks, for 
example through the growth and maintenance of mangroves on the archipelago.311 
Moreover, women’s participation should be encouraged and monitored to ensure that 
both women and men can equally benefit from any intervention carried out in the 
agricultural sector to tackle risks arising from climate change.312 Furthermore, the 
resilient-seed program should take into account biodiversity indicators and endow 
the local communities with biodiversity management skills.313 
B. The Procedural Prong: Jurisdiction and Standing 
The procedural prong of the access to justice, according to the distinction 
outlined previously,314 consists of access to courts.315 In light of our strategic 
evaluation, we point to the particular type of litigation that the case study would fall 
under and the standing, or locus standi, that it warrants. One of the most decisive 
aspects of this hypothetical case is jurisdiction, the choice of forum. Under Indian 
                                                          
 
309 See Non-U.S. Climate Change Litigation: India, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, 
http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-jurisdiction/india/ (last visited May 5, 2020). There are only two cases 
contained in the Sabin Center’s non-United States litigation chart. Id.; see Application Petition, Pandey v. 
Union of India et al. (National Green Tribunal Mar. 25, 2017), http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-
change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/2017/20170325_Original-
Application-No.-___-of-2017_petition-1.pdf; see also State of Himachal Pradesh, M.A. Nos. 389/2014, 
1145/2015, 1250/2015, 324/2016 & 325/2016 (Nat’l Green Tribunal) (India). But see Rajamani, supra 
note 174 (identifying cases tangentially touching upon climate change matters). 
310 See supra Part III. 
311 See supra Part III. 
312 See supra Part III.; see also WORLD BANK ET AL., supra note 294, at 1. 
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314 See supra Part II. 
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law, the forum that farmers or a representative NGO may turn to is the National 
Green Tribunal (“NGT”). Created in 2010, the NGT has the powers of a civil court 
and its jurisdiction spans the matters covered by seven major environmental laws.316 
The applicant in the hypothetical case study would have recourse to the NGT’s 
regional bench in Kolkata.317 
Quite importantly in regard to our focus on access to justice, one of the main 
drivers underlying the establishment of the NGT was the implementation of the 
access to justice prong encased in Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration.318 In terms of 
access to justice, the advantages of recurring to the NGT can be described as follows. 
First, the presence of experts on the NGT319 makes it well placed to seize upon and 
evaluate the scientific and technical contours of the seed-resilient program. 
Moreover, among the legal sources available to the NGT are India’s constitutional 
law, the principle of sustainable development, the precautionary principle, and the 
polluter pays principle.320 As we note below, India’s constitutional law provides an 
applicable legal basis for this case study. Similarly, it will be clear later that the 
applicability of the principles of sustainable development and precaution is 
particularly beneficial to the case study.321 Even more importantly, the NGT is 
empowered to determine its procedures, including evidence, under the principles of 
“natural justice.”322 Such circumstances increase the likelihood that the tribunal will 
streamline proceedings and exercise procedural fairness. The high status of the NGT 
can be inferred from the fact that its orders can only be challenged before the 
Supreme Court of India.323 Moreover, the NGT has a wide leeway to shape remedies; 
                                                          
 
316 National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, No. 19, Acts of Parliament, 2010 (India). The seven environmental 
laws are: the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974; the Water (Prevention and Control 
of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977; the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980; the Air (Prevention and Control of 
Pollution) Act, 1981; the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986; the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991; 
and the Biological Diversity Act, 2002. GEORGE PRING & CATHERINE PRING, UNITED NATIONS ENV’T 
PROGRAMME, ENVIRONMENTAL COURTS & TRIBUNALS 34 (2016), https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/ 
handle/20.500.11822/10001/environmental-courts-tribunals.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
317 The NGT is composed of a principal Delhi bench and four regional benches, and three additional circuit 
locations. FAQs, NAT’L GREEN TRIBUNAL, https://greentribunal.gov.in/faqs (last visited May 12, 2020). 
318 National Green Tribunal Act, pmbl. 
319 Id. § 4(1)(c); PRING & PRING, supra note 316, at 35. 
320 National Green Tribunal Act § 20; PRING & PRING, supra note 316, at 34. 
321 See infra Part IV.C. 
322 National Green Tribunal Act §§ 19(1)–(3). 
323 Id. § 22. 
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the only limit set forth in the NGT Act is that the matter be apt to be adjudicated.324 
The NGT has the power to adjudicate all seven environmental laws set forth in the 
NGT Act, which constitute its exclusive jurisdiction.325 Moreover, applicants can 
easily gain locus standi.326 Post-judgment enforcement, one of the predicaments of 
litigation centering on economic, social, and cultural rights,327 is also a centerpiece 
of the NGT’s regulation and practice. In fact, the NGT Act provides for sanctions in 
case the defendant, either private or public, does not comply with the NGT’s 
decisions.328 
Some disadvantages are nonetheless apparent. The seven environmental laws 
that circumscribe the NGT’s jurisdiction are not particularly tailored to the situation 
of the farmers on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.329 The Environment Protection 
Act and Biological Diversity Act are only related in principle, as the first revolves 
around environmental pollution, rather than degradation, and the second is 
unnecessary for the hypothetical case as the main objective is not to foster biological 
diversity.330 Moreover, mixed courts, such as the NGT, may also suffer from 
“technical” complexity, wanting to limit themselves to “technical” rulings. 
Nonetheless, these considerations do not sap the possibility for the NGT to be an 
extremely active and effective model for environmental tribunals.331 It is also true 
that the interpretation that the NGT itself made of the Environment Protection Act in 
the only climate change case so far decided in India is quite broad and may also 
encompass the subject matter of the case study.332 
An alternative to the NGT would be either the High Court of Kolkata or the 
Supreme Court of India. Both have writ jurisdiction, namely the jurisdictional power 
                                                          
 
324 Id. § 19(4)(k). 
325 Id. § 21. 
326 Id. § 18(2); see also Gitanjali Nain Gill, Mapping the Power Struggles of the National Green Tribunal 
of India: The Rise and Fall?, 2018 ASIAN J.L. & SOC’Y 1, 1, 9. 
327 Langford et al., supra note 160, at 3–4. 
328 National Green Tribunal Act §§ 26–28. 
329 On the adaptation challenges on the archipelago, see supra Part III. 
330 Compare generally Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, No. 29, Acts of Parliament, 1986 (India), with 
Biological Diversity Act, 2002, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2002 (India). 
331 PRING & PRING, supra note 316, at 35. 
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to adjudicate claims of fundamental rights violations. Moreover, they count on a long 
history of creative—and even activist—judgments, especially with respect to the 
right to food.333 Even in light of the NGT Act, either the High Court of Kolkata or 
the Supreme Court could have jurisdiction. The NGT jurisdiction on the matters is 
unclear and the risk for applicants is that the NGT cannot provide an alternative and 
efficacious remedy. Even if it could provide an alternative and efficacious remedy, 
it would still be possible to access remedies through either the Supreme Court or the 
High Court so long as the dismissal of the case “is likely to result in a miscarriage of 
justice.”334 It is not required that a “miscarriage of justice” can be proven, even in 
terms of probability.335 The strongest grounds for writ jurisdiction is that the NGT 
Act does not clearly establish exclusive jurisdiction on matters such as the one at 
issue, and that writ jurisdictions are best placed to adjudicate allegations of 
fundamental rights violations, as in this case. 
The “strategic” evaluation of jurisdiction choice is thus mixed: even though the 
NGT appears to be the “natural” forum where applicants can have their day in court, 
jurisdiction would still be problematic as the case study does not fit precisely into 
any of the seven environmental laws under the purview of the NGT. Recurring to the 
NGT would still be worth the risk if adjudication has a science-intensive approach, 
since the expert members of the NGT would be best placed to evaluate the feasibility 
and expansion of the resilient-seed program. The present case study, however, does 
not appear to be overly science-intensive, especially in consideration of the 
experimentation that has already been carried out by CIARI on the archipelago. It 
does not appear that the specifics of the case render the case factually disputed to the 
point of dissuading either the High Court or the Supreme Court from adjudicating 
the matter.336 We thus exclude the NGT. Given our preference for writ jurisdiction, 
from this point we will refer to applicants-plaintiffs as petitioners. 
We conclude that either the High Court of Kolkata or the Supreme Court 
provides a better forum for trying the case study. If petitioners’ resources are scarce, 
the Supreme Court should be chosen. Otherwise, first approaching the High Court 
and later the Supreme Court may offer a better chance for the farmers of the 
Andaman and Nicobar Islands to succeed in their suit. Under this second possibility, 
                                                          
 
333 Chitalkar & Gauri, supra note 243, at 288. 
334 Ganga Retreat & Towers v. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 12 SCC 91 (India). 
335 See, e.g., id. 
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one hindrance is the status of the lower courts, who are often less courageous than 
the country’s Supreme Court in shaping effective remedies. Considering our 
preference for writ jurisdiction, the case study falls under a particular type of rights-
based litigation, Public Interest Litigation (“PIL”), which contributed to the fame, in 
India and abroad, of the Supreme Court of India337 as well as to its influence on other 
South Asian jurisdictions.338 PIL was foreshadowed in United States civil 
adjudication as “public law litigation” in a renowned article from 1976.339 Its 
importance lies in shifting the scope of a lawsuit from the letter of the law to a scope 
shaped primarily by the court and parties, with a view to precipitate social change.340 
More generally, PIL has been seen as enhancing public participation by providing an 
arena for marginalized groups and interests.341 PIL in India can be traced back to the 
late 1970s and early 1980s.342 With reference to our case study, hinging on 
environmental matters, litigation can be also termed Public Interest Environmental 
Litigation (“PIEL”).343 The procedural effect of PIL and PIEL is to relax standing 
requirements to the point that courts grant standing to all “public-spirited citizens—
both those wishing to espouse the cause of the poor and oppressed (representative 
standing) and those wishing to enforce performance of public duties (citizen 
                                                          
 
337 Michael G. Faure & A.V. Raja, Effectiveness of Environmental Public Interest Litigation in India: 
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340 See Chayes, supra note 339, at 1302 (listing distinctive traits of public law litigation); see also 
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769 (1985) (describing how marginalized groups are often required to fight for their rights in an elite-
dominated society). 
342 Rajamani, supra note 174, at 11 (recalling S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, (1982) 2 S.C.R. 365 (India)). 
343 RAZZAQUE, supra note 338, at 1; see also Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 
100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2347 (1991) (displaying the variant of transnational public law litigation). 
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standing).”344 PIL has also enabled courts to adopt a broader spectrum of remedies.345 
Especially in developing countries, PIL was in fact meant to facilitate access to 
justice.346 
In the case study, centered on the enforcement of fundamental rights, access to 
the Kolkata High Court or the Supreme Court is indeed enabled by PIL. Both Article 
226347 and Article 32348 of the Indian Constitution grant access to justice for the 
enforcement of fundamental rights. While Article 226 provides for access to the 
Kolkata High Court, Article 32 permits direct recourse to the Supreme Court. On the 
one hand, Indian courts have acknowledged the departure from a strict rule of locus 
standi applicable for private actions.349 On the other, no “rigid litmus test” has 
emerged.350 Therefore, standing here is highly likely but not ensured, and it would 
depend on the parties to the case study. 
On this latter point, we identify as petitioners the archipelago farmers that are 
not yet part of the resilient-seed program or representative NGOs. So far, they appear 
to be well placed to request the diffusion of the resilient-seed program. With 
reference to defendants, we consider that climate-smart programs would be better 
coordinated at the level of the central Government of India in particular the Ministry 
of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, where they could be encased in the 
NAPCC. Moreover, the research institute that developed the resilient-seed program, 
CIARI, was founded by the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (“ICAR”), an 
autonomous organization under a governmental department, the Ministry of 
Agriculture, and the central government itself.351 A further defendant would be the 
Food Corporation of India (“FCI”), which was established by legislation in 1964 in 
                                                          
 
344 Rajamani, supra note 174, at 11. 
345 Chitalkar & Gauri, supra note 243, at 293. 
346 Faure & Raja, supra note 337, at 248. 
347 INDIA CONST. art. 226, § 1 (adopted by the Constituent Assembly on Nov. 26, 1949 and into force on 
Jan. 26, 1950). 
348 Id. art. 32. 
349 Normwati Binti Hashim, Moves Towards Progressive Legal Framework and Energetic Jurisprudential 
Behavioral on the Enforcement of Public Interest Litigation in the New Millennium, 105 PROCEDIA—
SOC. & BEHAV. SCI. 484, 487 (2013); see also Faure & Raja, supra note 337, at 249. 
350 Hashim, supra note 349, at 487. 
351 About Us, INDIAN COUNCIL OF AGRIC. RESEARCH, https://icar.org.in/content/about-us (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2019). 
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order to support the interests of farmers, distribute food grains, and maintain 
operational and buffer stocks of food grains for national food security.352 The FCI 
was sued in the most important case on the right to food that has so far emerged in 
India’s case law, which we consider further on in the course of this Article.353 
As explained in the next sub-section, we argue that petitioners are in a position 
to require the extension of the resilient-seed program for the protection of their right 
to food and an adequate standard of living. Such farmers or NGOs are entitled to 
advocate for the farmers’ right to food because within such a right is encompassed 
food availability and adequacy, or “the possibility of individuals to directly feed 
themselves from productive land or other natural resources.”354 More intuitively, 
petitioners would plead in court for the protection of the farmers’ right to an adequate 
standard of living, which is warranted when individuals have sufficient means—
including food—to sustain themselves and live with dignity. A further possibility 
could prove very useful for petitioners willing to bring the lawsuit on behalf of not 
only the current farming community, but also future generations of people living off 
the land on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The legal basis that would make such 
a possibility more tangible is the international environmental principle of 
intergenerational equity noted above.355 In this fashion, the Urgenda court set forth 
the intergenerational principle in order to allow the plaintiff NGO to plead on behalf 
of future generations.356 In the context of adjudication in Indian courts, the principle 
of intergenerational equity has risen to the status of an environmental principle 
within Indian law.357 By applying the principle of intergenerational equity as one of 
both international law and Indian law, the relevant court is in a position to confer 
standing on present and future generations of farmers in the archipelago.358 
                                                          
 
352 About Us, FOOD CORP. OF INDIA, http://fci.gov.in/aboutUs.php (last visited Nov. 12, 2019). 
353 PUCL v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 (2001) (India) [hereinafter PUCL, Writ Petition]; 
see infra Part IV.C. 
354 See supra Part II.B.3 (referencing to the construction of the right to food laid down in the human rights 
framework). 
355 See supra Part II.B.4.b. 
356 Hof’s-Gravenhage 9 oktober 2018, AB 2018, 417 m.nt. GA van der Veen, Ch.W. Backes (Staat der 
Nederlanden/Stichting Urgenda) (Neth.). This part of the judgment was neither repealed, nor confirmed 
on appeals. 
357 State of Himachal Pradesh v. Ganesh Wood Products, AIR 1996 SC 149, 159 (India). 
358 In Ganesh Wood Products, the principle of intergenerational equity did not serve the purpose of 
enhancing access to justice on behalf of future generations, yet such interpretation may follow from the 
openness of the Supreme Court of India to transnational judicial dialogue, for example, by reference to 
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Be that as it may, the issues that we identified with regard to the procedural 
prong of access to justice are premised on a number of limitations. In particular, 
many civil society actors in addition to farmers or representative NGOs are in a 
position to plead for the right to food of all peoples living on the archipelago.359 
Similarly, this applies to the right to an adequate standard of living, especially 
through farming, for all peoples living on the archipelago. Requests for the 
protection of one’s right to an adequate standard of living are even more pressing for 
those famers who had to leave the agricultural sector due to the impacts of the 2004 
tsunami and climate change.360 However, for reasons of feasibility, we restrain the 
scope of our case study to current farmers living off the land on the archipelago or 
representative NGOs. 
C. The Substantive Prong: Effective Remedies 
1. Introduction 
The substantive prong of access to justice, according to the distinction outlined 
previously,361 consists of access to effective remedies.362 A more informed 
discussion can ensue from the partition of the rights at hand in the case study, the 
right to food and an adequate standard of living, and the requested remedies. As will 
become clear, the legal basis supporting the rights to be protected does not always 
coincide with, but is rather complemented by, the legal basis underpinning effective 
remedies. 
2. The Cause of Action 
In our case study, farmers and NGOs on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands can 
easily reap the fruits of the “Rights Revolution” that occurred in India in the 1980s, 
when India’s courts unleashed the justiciability of economic, social, and cultural 
rights.363 Central to the Rights Revolution was Article 21 of India’s Constitution 
                                                          
 
cases from other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Vellore Citizens Welfare Reform v. Union of India et al., (1996) 
5 SCC 647 (India). 
359 For an example, see the Snahalaya Ashram charity, based in Port Blair (Andaman and Nicobar Islands), 
which includes access to food and sustainability within its mission. See What We Do, SNAHALAYA 
ASHRAM, http://www.snahalayaashram.com/WhatWeDo.html (last visited May 12, 2020). 
360 See supra Part III (discussing these impacts). 
361 See supra Part II. 
362 See supra Part II. 
363 Chitalkar & Gauri, supra note 243, at 292. 
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regarding the right to life.364 Article 21 serves the purpose of the type of litigation 
that we put forward: it can expand the seed-resilient program to more areas, possibly 
the entire archipelago of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. India’s Supreme Court 
has interpreted Article 21 to encompass the right to livelihood,365 which equates to 
the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to food.366 The most important 
decision rendered by India’s Supreme Court on the right to food and the right to 
livelihood is People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India and Others 
(“PUCL”), where the contours and justiciability of these two fundamental rights 
were refined.367 In PUCL, the Indian Supreme Court ruled that the duty to fulfill the 
right to food derived from the right to life, a duty that had been breached by the 
state.368 In particular, the state had failed to implement food schemes and distribution 
in the context of starvation and risk thereof, despite the availability of grain stocks.369 
The court ordered interim measures consisting of a wide range of actions, including 
the implementation of the Famine Code, that the grain allocation for the food-for-
work scheme be doubled, that financial support for existing food security schemes 
be increased, and other measures that supported vulnerable groups.370 With reference 
to the right to livelihood, the PUCL interim orders recognized the right to an adequate 
means of living, and even the right to work, within the right to food.371 Building on 
PUCL, the petitioners in the case study are in a position to argue that the right to food 
and nutritional security is not a matter of welfare policy, but rather a matter of 
constitutional rights.372 
Regarding both the right to life and the right to livelihood, India’s Supreme 
Court has not only expanded and articulated the implications of Article 21 of the 
Constitution. It has also interpreted the latter consistently with some of the directive 
                                                          
 
364 INDIA CONST. art. 21. 
365 Olga Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp., AIR 1986 SC 180 (India). 
366 Mullin v. Administrator, (1981) 2 SCR 516, 529 (India). 
367 Lauren Birchfield & Jessica Corsi, The Right to Life Is the Right to Food: People’s Union for Civil 
Liberties v. Union of India & Others, 17 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 15, 15 (2010); see also Air India Statutory 
Corp. v. United Labour Union & Others, AIR 1996 SC 645 (India). 
368 See PUCL, Writ Petition, supra note 353. 
369 See Birchfield & Corsi, supra note 367, at 15. 
370 See generally PUCL, Writ Petition, supra note 353. 
371 Id.; Chitalkar & Gauri, supra note 243, at 299. 
372 See PUCL, Writ Petition, supra note 353; Chitalkar & Gauri, supra note 243, at 297. 
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principles of India’s Constitution, which were not meant to be enforceable.373 In 
particular, the directive principle on the state’s duty to ensure people’s right to 
livelihood in Article 39(a) and the state’s duty to raise the level of nutrition and the 
standard of living of its people in Article 47.374 
Moreover, for the purposes of our case study, the legal content of the 
Constitution can be fleshed out by interpreting Article 21 through the lens of 
international law. Such an interpretive mechanism, as seen previously, is called the 
indirect application of international law, or the consistent interpretation of national 
law according to international law.375 Besides featuring in landmark climate change 
cases worldwide since 2015,376 the indirect application of international law can thrive 
in Indian courts in particular. In fact, the Supreme Court of India has recognized that 
all international legal norms to which India is bound can be enforced by Indian courts 
so long as they are in harmony with the spirit of the Constitution and do not conflict 
with the fundamental rights provisions provided therein.377 India is party to all 
agreements previously considered under the climate change treaty regime and the 
human rights framework.378 The provisions enshrined in India’s constitution on the 
right to food and the right to an adequate standard of living can be supported by the 
human rights framework examined previously, specifically Article 11 of the 
ICESCR as construed by the CESC Committee.379 
                                                          
 
373 Chitalkar & Gauri, supra note 243, at 297 n.19. 
374 The court applied Article 39(a) and Article 47 of the Constitution of India. Id. 
375 See supra Part II. 
376 See supra Part II. 
377 Visaka v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011 (India). The court explained the indirect application 
of international law as applicable within the Indian legal order. Id.; see also Nihal Jayawickrama, India, 
in THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 243, 246 (David 
Sloss ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2009). Additionally, in this regard, see INDIA CONST. art. 51(c). 
378 India ratified the UNFCCC on November 1, 1993, accessed the Kyoto Protocol on August 26, 2002, 
and ratified the Paris Agreement on October 2, 2016. See India, UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE, 
https://unfccc.int/tools_xml/country_IN.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2020). India accessed the ICESCR and 
ICCPR on April 10, 1979. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
UNITED NATIONS, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
3&chapter=4&clang=_en (last visited Feb. 16, 2020) (showing India accessed the ICESCR on April 10, 
1979); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS, https://treaties.un.org/ 
Pages/ ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&clang=_en (last visited Feb. 16, 2020) 
(showing India accessed the ICCPR on April 10, 1979). 
379 See supra Part II.B.3. 
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For its part, the international climate regime would also support the petitioners’ 
claim. In fact, incorporating this concept for the first time, the Paris Agreement 
maintains that state parties should “respect, promote and consider their respective 
obligations on human rights.”380 Moreover, the PA specifically highlights “the 
fundamental priority of safeguarding food security and ending hunger, and the 
particular vulnerabilities of food production systems to the adverse impacts of 
climate change.”381 Such a recital is clearly tailored to the purposes of the litigation 
portrayed in this case study, and the PA’s Preamble bears on the interpretation of the 
entire Agreement.382 
3. The Effective Remedy 
The type of remedy that petitioners can request varies. In order to restrict the 
scope of the analysis, we consider the common core of the remedy, its legal basis, 
and two modes for enforcing it. First, the common core of the remedy hinges on a 
request to the most appropriate court, as determined previously,383 to issue a 
declaratory judgment and an order to the central government and the FCI. 
Declaratory judgments are the most typical type of relief in human rights 
adjudication.384 In a declaratory judgment, the judge would establish that the right to 
an adequate standard of living and the right to food for the farmers who are not yet 
included in the resilient-seed project have been infringed due to the inaction or 
insufficient action by the government of India and the FCI in light of the impacts of 
climate change and IPCC projections of the long-lasting effects of the 2004 
tsunami.385 Yet, declaratory judgments often fall short of preventing further harm.386 
To avoid “empty” rulings, PIL and the specific case law developed by Indian courts 
are pivotal to petitioners’ remedy. The order that the judge would issue in the case 
study may be laid out as follows. First, it would establish the necessity of countering 
the non-resilient circumstances characterizing rice production on the archipelago of 
the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Second, it would compel the central government 
                                                          
 
380 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, annex (Dec. 12, 2015). 
381 Id. ¶ 9. 
382 See supra Part II.B.2.d. 
383 See supra Part IV.B. 
384 Duyck et al., supra note 110, at 202. 
385 See supra Part III. 
386 Duyck et al., supra note 110, at 202. 
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and the FCI to remediate the situation by expanding the resilient-seed program 
described previously.387 In so doing, the food production system would be more 
resilient in terms of intensification and expansion,388 and farmers would find a 
significant livelihood growing rice crops from the resilient seed. The community at 
large would be empowered to manage biodiversity through a participatory mode 
within which “Seed Ambassador” farmers are the centerpiece.389 Such an extension 
of the program should be accompanied by scientific research on the factors that 
contribute to the resilience of the food system (at least at the regional level of the 
archipelago),390 for instance a macro-level research project. The program extension 
should also be reinforced by ongoing updates and a close, feedback loop to monitor 
the effects of the diffusion of the program, constituting a micro-level research 
project. In this way, even unpredictable fallouts from the project would be addressed 
head-on. Be that as it may, the choice of this particular program should not be carved 
in stone. Rather, petitioners may also ask the judge to require the government to 
improve the program.391 
As a further measure within the ruling, the judge would require governmental 
authorities to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of remediating the soil in areas of the 
archipelago subject to agricultural use that have been submerged since the 2004 
tsunami and those that have been abandoned due to salt water infiltration.392 Those 
expanses of land lie unproductive, but could possibly be part of the resilient-seed 
program in a second phase following judicial review. The choice of cost-
effectiveness as the most appropriate type of analysis to evaluate soil remediation 
measures springs from the application of the precautionary principle as formulated 
in the UNFCCC.393 Pursuant to Article 3(3) of the UNFCCC, parties shall guarantee 
that “policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so 
as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.”394 However, a conundrum 
may follow this judgment. Albeit cost-effective, soil remediation is not feasible 
                                                          
 
387 See supra Part III. 
388 See supra Part I (identifying the three indicators of resilience in food production systems). 
389 See supra Part III. 
390 Seekell et al., supra note 20 (advocating for nation-scale indicators of resilience). 
391 See supra Part III (detailing some of the possible modifications). 
392 See supra Part III. 
393 See supra Part II.B. 
394 UNFCCC, supra note 41, at art. 3(3). 
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given the strain on financial resources that governmental authorities are currently 
experiencing.395 Further, expanding the program might ineffectively drain public 
resources. On the one hand, it appears that escalating the program is unlikely to be 
overly expensive as the program is partly based on a “buyback” scheme and has 
already been tested locally.396 On the other hand, it should be recalled that, even 
when resources have proved inadequate, states parties should still ensure the widest 
possible enjoyment of the relevant rights.397 A possible avenue may consist of 
international climate finance. 
An understanding of the importance of climate finance has lately dawned upon 
the international community, and the PA offers a meaningful forum where developed 
states parties are under obligation to financially assist developing states parties with 
respect to both mitigation and adaptation,398 and biennially report on such 
assistance.399 Moreover, developed state parties shall provide information “on 
financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support provided” to developing 
states parties and the latter “should provide information on financial, technology 
transfer and capacity-building support needed and received.”400 Such capacity-
building is an evident feature of the common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities principle.401 More tangibly, it is important to note here the 
recent financing of climate change-resilient seeds at the International Rice Research 
Institute (“IRRI”).402 In fact, interest in this area of research is mounting 
internationally. A further possibility would be for India’s government to request 
international aid under the model of the Pacific Adaptation to Climate Change 
(“PACC”) initiative, which, inter alia, has a resilient agriculture program on 
                                                          
 
395 Cf. Ratlam Mun. Council v. Vardhichand & Others, AIR 1980 SC 1622 (India) (“The law will 
relentlessly be enforced and the plea of poor finance will be poor alibi when people in misery cry for 
justice). 
396 See supra Part III. 
397 See supra Part II.B.3. 
398 Paris Agreement, supra note 43, art. 9(1); see also id. art. 9(7) (identifying the type of information that 
developed states parties are called on to covey to developing states parties). 
399 Id. art. 9(5). 
400 Id. arts. 13(8), 13(9). 
401 See supra Part II.B. 
402 THOMAS REUTERS FOUND., World’s Largest Rice Gene Bank Secures Funding to Fight Climate 
Change, ECO-BUS. (Oct. 16, 2018), www.eco-business.com/news/worlds-largest-rice-gene-bank-
secures-funding-to-fight-climate-change/. 
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Samoa.403 The legal basis underpinning such a remedy is Article 4(1) of the 
UNFCCC requiring all States Parties to adopt measures to “[f]ormulate [and] 
implement . . . programs containing . . . measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to 
climate change.”404 Emphasis is placed on the duty of states that are parties to the 
UNFCCC to “develop and elaborate appropriate and integrated plans for coastal zone 
management, water resources and agriculture.”405 As previously explained, the 
stringency of such duties is supported by the use of the auxiliary verb “shall” in the 
text of the UNFCCC, setting forth a legal obligation on all parties to develop 
adaptation policies. Further, short of an explicit reference to adaptation, the 
UNFCCC nonetheless requires states to promote “the development, application and 
diffusion, including transfer, of technologies, practices and processes that control, 
reduce or prevent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases . . . in all relevant 
sectors, including . . . agriculture.”406 Such a provision fully applies to our case 
study. 
In the case study, we have criticized the current need to largely import rice from 
the mainland to the archipelago, which increases GHG emissions and stifles local 
solutions to food security. In light of the provisions set forth in the UNFCCC, the 
resilient-seed program is poised to facilitate the mitigation co-benefits of adaptation 
by diffusing climate-smart agricultural technology. This type of remedy correlates to 
a further provision, Article 4(1)(f) of the UNFCCC, which was triggered in Earthlife: 
pursuant to which states are to take climate change considerations into account in 
their social, economic, and environmental policies and actions.407 The government 
mandate would thus be framed within the social, economic, and environmental 
policies and actions for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. 
It does not seem that the Kyoto Protocol adds a further basis for the UNFCCC 
provisions.408 Yet, the obligation that it lays out in Article 10 infuses UNFCCC 
obligations with two procedural duties: the implementation and regular update of 
                                                          
 
403 PACC Country Projects, PAC. REG’L ENVTL. PROGRAMME, https://www.sprep.org/node/946 (last 
visited Nov. 14, 2018). 
404 UNFCCC, supra note 41, art. 4(1)(b). 
405 Id. art. 4(1)(e). 
406 Id. art. 4(1)(c). 
407 See supra Part II.B.2.b.; see also UNFCCC, supra note 41, art. 3 (proposing that policies and measures 
should take into account socio-economic contexts). 
408 See supra Part II.B.2. 
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adaptation programs.409 Both duties are particularly relevant in the context of the 
case study. In fact, the remedy consists of expanding the resilient-seed project only 
so long as it is still feasible and can be classified as a best practice within the context 
of the archipelago. One of the more extensive specifications of the adaptation 
obligations can be found in the PA.410 The PA does not mince words on resilience, 
which features largely in the Preamble and as early in the operative section as Article 
2(1)(b).411 This provision embeds the importance of the mitigation co-benefits 
ensuing from adaptation measures further emphasized in Article 4(7) and Article 
7(4) and relates climate resilience especially to the need “not to threaten food 
production.”412 The resilient-seed program would accord not only with this latter 
objective, but also with the obligation that adaptation measures protect “people, 
livelihoods and ecosystems,” especially in light of “the urgent and immediate needs” 
of those developing state signatories that are most vulnerable to climate change and 
its effects,413 such as India.414 
The key contribution that the resilient-seed program can make—not only to 
food security, livelihoods, and ecosystems within the archipelago, but also for the 
state’s compliance with international law—is that it operationalizes the obligation on 
all parties to the PA to “engage in adaptation planning processes and the 
implementation of actions, including the development or enhancement of relevant 
plans, policies and/or contributions.”415 Within its adaptation framework, each state 
may, for instance, engage in “the process to formulate and implement national 
adaptation plans” to establish “nationally determined prioritized actions” and to build 
“the resilience of socioeconomic and ecological systems.”416 The resilient-seed 
program emerges as one of the possible actions to be prioritized within India’s 
adaptation plan in order to build the resilience of the socioeconomic and ecological 
systems of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.417 The technology-intensive character 
                                                          
 
409 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 42, at art. 10; see also supra Part II.B.2.c. 
410 See supra Part II.B.2.d. 
411 Paris Agreement, supra note 43, at art. 2(1)(b). 
412 Id. art. 4(7), 7(4); see also supra Part II.B.2.d. 
413 Paris Agreement, supra note 43, art. 7(2); see also supra Part II.B.2.d. 
414 See supra Part I. 
415 Paris Agreement, supra note 43, art. 7(9); see also supra Part II.B.2.d. 
416 Paris Agreement, supra note 43, art. 7(9). 
417 See supra Part III. 
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of the resilient-seed program is especially germane to one of the prompts embedded 
in the PA in the context of adaptation. A technology-intensive, long-term action for 
adaptation such as the one described herein would find support in the state’s “long-
term vision on the importance of fully realizing technology development and transfer 
in order to improve resilience to climate change.”418 The participative and gender-
sensitive characteristics of the resilient-seed program, as modified in our proposal,419 
ally with the obligation set forth in the PA under which adaptive actions should be 
“country-driven, gender-responsive, [and] participatory.”420 Considering that the 
program has been created by CIARI, a reputed scientific institution, it can fulfill the 
obligation by which adaptation measures should be “based on and guided by the best 
available science.”421 
Even though the legal basis for the remedy to be shaped by the court in the case 
study is grounded predominantly in the international climate change regime, the 
human rights framework makes the order a “duty” in light of the positive obligations 
of states. As previously considered, state parties to the ICESCR are under the 
obligation to respect, protect and fulfill the right to food enshrined in Article 11 of 
the ICESCR by ensuring both its availability and accessibility.422 This obligation is 
further reinforced by the cross-reference within the PA to human rights obligations 
bearing upon states.423 For the purposes of the case study, the availability of food, 
namely the possibility for individuals to directly feed themselves from productive 
land, for which all states parties to the ICESCR should allow. With regard to the 
right to livelihood, which the ICESCR similarly recognizes in Article 11, states are 
required to be proactive in granting people’s access to resources enabling their 
livelihood.424 
A further legal basis for the remedy that we put forward in the case study can 
be found in the international environmental precautionary principle, which came to 
the fore in the case law of India’s Supreme Court as an obligation for the state 
government and statutory authorities to “anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of 
                                                          
 
418 Paris Agreement, supra note 43, art. 10(1); see also supra Part II.B.2.d. 
419 See supra notes 417–20 and accompanying text. 
420 Paris Agreement, supra note 43, art. 7(5); see also supra Part II.B.2.d. 
421 Paris Agreement, supra note 43, art. 7(5); see also supra Part II.B.2.d. 
422 See supra Part II.B.3. 
423 See supra Part II.B.3. 
424 See supra Part II.B.2.d. 
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environmental degradation” by way of environmental measures.425 The remedy 
provided in the case law appears precautionary in that soil degradation on the 
archipelago poses threats of serious and irreversible damage, some of which is 
already scientifically certain, while some is still scientifically uncertain.426 Still, in 
the formulation of the precautionary principle fleshed out in Indian case law and 
international law, the lack of scientific certainty should not be used as a grounds for 
postponing adaptation measures.427 Deploying the precautionary principle to support 
the measures required of the government would also facilitate the procedural position 
of petitioners as they would not need to prove all detrimental effects of the 
government’s inaction on the soil, food security, and their livelihood. Rather, the 
government would shoulder the burden of proof with regard to the sufficiency of its 
action.428 
The specific demand of remediating soil degradation harkens back to the 
principle of sustainable development as interpreted by the Supreme Court of India. 
Sustainable development is, in fact, a process encompassing the remediation of the 
damaged environment.429 Moreover, the participatory and educational features of the 
resilient-seed program would be especially relevant to the constituent elements of 
the sustainable development principle, as hammered out by India’s Supreme Court. 
In the Supreme Court’s words, “[n]o government can cope with the problem of 
environmental repair by itself alone; peoples’ voluntary participation in 
environmental management is a must for sustainable development.”430 In this line of 
reasoning, we believe that the resilient-seed program offers concrete incentives for 
voluntary participation. Furthermore, the program is poised to offer a practical 
toolkit for the local population’s stewardship of natural resources for future 
generations (intergenerational equity). India’s Supreme Court has applied the 
precautionary principle and the principle of sustainable development, including 
intergenerational equity, as principles of customary international law and national 
                                                          
 
425 Vellore Citizens Welfare Reform v. Union of India et al., (1996) 5 SCC 647 (India). 
426 See supra Part III. 
427 Vellore Citizens, 5 SCC 647 (referencing no specific adaptation measures, but rather pointing to 
environmental measures in general); see UNFCCC, supra note 41, art. 3(3) (exemplifying this formulation 
of the precautionary principle in the international climate change regime). 
428 See Vellore Citizens, 5 SCC 647 (explaining that the reversal of the burden of proof is more of a 
“creation” of national courts rather than international law); see also Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. 
v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 164 (Apr. 20) (against the reversal of the burden of proof). 
429 See Vellore Citizens, 5 SCC 647. 
430 Karnataka Indus. Areas Dev. Bd. v. Kenchappa & Others, AIR 2006 SC 2038 (India). 
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law,431 pursuant to the approach previously examined, i.e., the indirect application of 
international law.432 
As to the modes of implementation, we put forward two models. The first is 
molded on Leghari, the climate change case in Pakistan referenced previously,433 
while the latter builds on PUCL. In Leghari, the Green Bench of Lahore’s High 
Court—relying on a variety of legal bases including constitutional law, the 
precautionary principle, equity, and the sustainable development principle434—
established a Climate Change Commission (“CCC”).435 The CCC consisted of thirty 
members—a lawyer as its chair, scientific experts, the highest ranking government 
functionaries, and representatives of civil society, universities and the media—who 
would coordinate and contribute to “mobilizing the government machinery.”436 
Established in September 2015, the CCC was dissolved only in January 2018, after 
a number of interim orders.437 Its mission was over: the CCC had mobilized the 
governmental machinery for 66.11% of the priority actions for adaptations set forth 
in Pakistan’s climate change implementation framework.438 To gradually remove the 
fully-fledged environmental control held by the Pakistani government in climate 
matters, the Green Bench established a Standing Committee and nominated as its 
chair the previous chair of the CCC.439 
Similar to the enforcement model deployed in Leghari, the competent court in 
the case study could summon legal experts, the scientists involved in the resilient-
seed program at CIARI, other scientific experts, the highest ranking governmental 
                                                          
 
431 See Vellore Citizens, 5 SCC 647; see also Jagannath v. Union of India & Others, (1997) 2 SCC 87 
(India) (recognizing intergenerational equity’s customary status due to its connection with sustainable 
development). 
432 See supra Part II.A. 
433 See supra Part II.A. 
434 See Leghari v. Pak., (2015) W.P. No. 25501/2015 (Lahore High Ct.) ¶ 7 (Pak.). 
435 See id. ¶ 8. 
436 Id. ¶ 7; see also Parvez Hassan, Judicial Commissions and Climate Justice in Pakistan 10, 15–16 
(Feb. 26, 2018) (unpublished conference paper), https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/content/documents/ 
2018/parvez_hassan_judicial_commissions_and_climate_justice_in_pakistan.pdf. The Commission is 
divided into six sub-committees and all CCC members worked on a pro-bono basis. Id. at 8, 16. 
437 Leghari, W.P. No. 25501/2015 ¶ 24 (2018) (dissolving the CCC). 
438 Id. ¶ 18. 
439 Hassan, supra note 436, at 13. 
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functionaries, as well as representatives of civil society, universities, and the media. 
By way of interim orders, the court would supervise the expansion of the program 
and consider the remediation of submerged soil. The commission would be dissolved 
once the program had spread to a number of locations sufficient to strengthen the 
resilience of the socio-economic and ecological systems of the archipelago, but not 
necessarily to the point of self-sufficiency. The ultimate extension of the program 
would largely depend on biospheric integrity and the result of the research projects 
put forward at the micro- and macro-level. 
Building on PUCL, this case study’s proposed enforcement model would rest 
on the appointment of two commissioners tasked with monitoring and reporting on 
the implementation of the court’s orders.440 Monitoring would include an analysis of 
the available data, the receipt and evaluation of complaints from grassroots 
organizations, and the establishment of inquiry commissions.441 In both proposed 
enforcement models, best practice would be determined within the commission, or 
among commissioners, by consensus.442 For both models of enforcement, the post-
judgment involvement of the court would be guaranteed by interim orders,443 as well 
as the ability to open suo moto proceedings in cases of non-compliance.444 For both 
models, the main tenet would be to foster a process of communicative, non-
adversarial rationality,445 encouraging a serious governmental response, 
coordination among different public entities, and exposing governmental bodies to 
specific types of knowledge.446 Such a participative process is particularly beneficial 
to the effectiveness of PIL. In fact, “[t]he enforcement of social and economic rights 
typically requires a complex support system beyond the litigation itself,” including 
branches of government and civil society.447 
Legal and other factors may affect the enforcement of the decision. With regard 
to legal factors, clarity of the judgments and the legitimacy of the process play a 
crucial role. The clearer, more specific, and practical the decision and subsequent 
                                                          
 
440 Chitalkar & Gauri, supra note 243, at 298. 
441 Id. at 298–99. 
442 Hassan, supra note 436, at 16. 
443 On PUCL v. Union of India, see Chitalkar & Gauri, supra note 243, at 299. 
444 Id. at 303. This is considered the direct approach to compliance monitoring. See id. at 302–03. 
445 Id. at 300; see also Hassan, supra note 436, at 5. 
446 Chitalkar & Gauri, supra note 243, at 300; see also Hassan, supra 435, at 15–16. 
447 Chitalkar & Gauri, supra note 243, at 304. 
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orders are, the more likely there will be compliance.448 Considering that in both of 
the enforcement models described herein the court would rely on private and public 
actors, as well as on its own enforcement mechanisms, the activity of the court may 
be perceived as particularly legitimate.449 With respect to non-legal factors, a 
variable that would be decisive for the effectiveness of the case study is the economic 
and political environment of India.450 The visibility of several issues (e.g., the high 
price of rice and climate adaptation challenges) would make it more difficult for 
governmental authorities to ignore the orders.451 Considering the general outlook 
predicted for malnourishment, demographic booms, and climate adaptation 
challenges discussed previously,452 it does not appear outlandish that a similar 
program may find support at the economic and political levels. Looking back on the 
lessons of the past, the success of India’s PIL on the right to food was also due to the 
prevailing economic and political environment in India at the time of the rulings.453 
In addition to the political and economic environment, support from civil 
society is of utmost importance. Indian PIL on the right to food has been particularly 
successful on account of the campaign mounted through “public hearings, rallies, 
action-oriented research, media advocacy and lobbying of members of 
parliament.”454 Moreover, civil society is well placed to verify the enforcement of 
legal decisions and require information (e.g., on the basis of the 2005 Right to 
Information Act). In both enforcement models, either by the establishment of a 
commission or the appointment of two commissioners, the main tenet is that 
environmental procedural rights shall be preserved. Such a tenet corresponds to 
Article 21 of India’s Constitution, from which the rights to information and 
community participation for the protection of the environment and human health also 
flow.455 Either enforcement mode may count on Article 141 of the Indian 
                                                          
 
448 Id. at 302. 
449 Id.; cf. Gill, supra note 337, at 3–4 (explaining that criticism has swept the NGT’s decisions). 
450 For this factor in PUCL, see Chitalkar & Gauri, supra note 243, at 306–07. 
451 Id. at 302; see also supra Part III (detailing the archipelago’s adaptation challenges). 
452 See supra Part I. 
453 For an explanation of how the economic and political environment factored in under the PUCL case 
law, see Chitalkar & Gauri, supra note 243, at 306–07. 
454 Id. at 305. 
455 Research Found. for Sci. Tech. & Nat. Res. Policy v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 657 
(2005) (India). 
 
 C O M P A R A T I V E  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  L I T I G A T I O N   
 
P A G E  |  5 9 3   
 
 
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2020.717 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 
Constitution, which provides that any law declared by the Supreme Court shall be 
the law of the land,456 including obiter dicta and interim orders.457 The general 
respect for the Supreme Court has also attained the status of a social norm.458 
Moreover, failing to enforce the order may expose defendants to contempt of court, 
which is still a deterrent that encourages judicial enforcement in India.459 
Either enforcement mode necessarily suffers from some limitations. In Leghari, 
the CCC constituted by the judge was disassembled once most priority actions had 
been addressed.460 Even though the judge established a further body to smooth the 
transition of full environmental competence to the government, no circumstance 
warrants effective action on the part of the governmental authorities in Pakistan. 
With regard to PUCL, the ruling itself did not achieve wholly satisfactory levels of 
enforcement, as results have varied across the type of food programs and across 
states.461 In our case study, the effectiveness of the remedy may be reduced by the 
need to incentivize farmers to voluntarily partake in experimentation. Furthermore, 
the case study would benefit from a consideration of whether the involvement of the 
local government of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands would produce the best 
remedy, or whether such involvement may make coordination more difficult. 
4. Preliminary Conclusions 
The case study that we have described is meant to precipitate adaptive measures 
in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. In particular, the action required from the 
competent court would be based on both national and international law. We argue 
that international law is poised to facilitate access to justice for individuals and 
NGOs. The previous discussion shows that, as opposed to the procedural prong, the 
substantive prong of this access to justice would substantially benefit from the 
indirect application of international law in Indian courts. In fact, several international 
legal provisions appear to buttress the remedy requested. We identified such 
applicable international law provisions within the international climate change 
regime, the human rights framework, and international environmental law 
principles—in particular the principles of precaution, intergenerational equity, and 
sustainable development. The measures ensuing from the judgment would thus 
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457 Faure & Raja, supra note 337, at 282. 
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459 Id. at 282. 
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follow as precautionary measures for the sustainable development of smallholder 
farmers living on the Archipelago. The order requested as a relief could be enforced 
by establishing a commission, in the mold of Leghari. Alternatively, it may be 
implemented by appointing two commissioners in charge of monitoring and ensuring 
the enforcement of the judgment by reporting back to the court, within the mold 
provided by the landmark PUCL judgment on the right to food, first decided by 
India’s Supreme Court in 2001. Both models warrant the post-judgment involvement 
of the court. 
While this is only one illustration of the possible adaptation measures 
underpinned by the international climate change regime, human rights law and 
international environmental principles, the case study offers the vantage point of 
combining practice and theory to provide a blueprint for how access to justice can 
precipitate climate-smart agriculture. 
V. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
The previous discussion has offered only a glimpse of the legal infrastructure 
that individuals and NGOs may rely on in order to protect their livelihoods and the 
environment. We have put forward a hypothetical case that smallholder farmers may 
file in India’s courts to counter the degradation and lack of adequate food resources 
in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, based on both national and international law. 
Inspired by a recent strand of climate change litigation, this “mixed fuel” of legal 
sources shows promise to increase the legitimacy of climate change regulation, and 
democratic participation to its enforcement. 
It is difficult to predict all the possible benefits that might follow from this 
climate litigation case. Still, it is possible to aver that the legal action at hand could 
spearhead the access to justice for adaptation measures to combat climate change, in 
terms of both access to courts and effective remedies. First, national litigation based 
on international law may be one of the few avenues to enforce international law. In 
fact, the international climate regime is defective in terms of enforcement because 
adaptation is mandated but must not be compulsorily communicated in conjunction 
with the NDCs.462 Until the “Paris rulebook” is finalized and the Adaptation 
Committee has developed further guidelines, it is uncertain how adaptation actions 
should be reported.463 Therefore, this type of litigation would be particularly 
                                                          
 
462 Paris Agreement, supra note 43, art. 7(2), (8); see also supra Part II.B.2.d. 
463 Paris Agreement, supra note 43, art. 13(8) (“Each Party should also provide information related to 
climate change impacts and adaptation under Article 7, as appropriate”). 
 
 C O M P A R A T I V E  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  L I T I G A T I O N   
 
P A G E  |  5 9 5   
 
 
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2020.717 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 
beneficial to the effectiveness of the international legal regime by bolstering the 
decentralized enforcement of international law in climate change matters by courts. 
Moreover, access to justice will depend on the very benefits of the program, which 
is poised to sustainably increase productivity, adaptation to climate change, 
mitigation of GHGs, and overall resilience.464 Moreover, this type of litigation may 
discourage claims based on loss and damages, which, albeit meritorious, are more 
oriented to past wrongs than future “fixes,” and fall outside the realm of Article 8 of 
the PA. In fact, the Conference of the Parties Decision adopting the PA excludes 
losses and damages under Article 8 as grounds for liability or compensation.465 
Similarly, this type of litigation would be an alternative to insurance: on the one 
hand, it is not easy to tailor climate insurance to the needs of the poorest individuals. 
On the other hand, “many of the most damaging aspects of climate change are too 
costly to be insurable.”466 
Some limitations to the study should be acknowledged. The resilient-seed 
program portrayed within is only one of the possible strategies to counter soil 
salinity, even though it has been tested locally and provides a good first step. 
Moreover, it remains feasible that rural communities may attain access to justice by 
the sole application of national law, absent the indirect application of international 
law in national courts. Furthermore, this type of judicial involvement for adaptation 
programs may be dubbed “executive judicial activism,” which occurs in decisions 
concerning PIL when a court “effectively takes the place of either politicians or 
bureaucrats”467 by “executing the law.”468 One of the objections in the past to such 
types of litigation has been that judicial involvement to the point of “activism” lowers 
the usefulness of an efficient bureaucracy.469 It can also undermine trust in the 
government.470 What is also true is that endless judicial oversight is not sustainable 
given the number of PIL cases filed in India’s courts.471 These criticisms have also 
                                                          
 
464 See supra Part III. 
465 Adoption of the Paris Agreement, supra note 379, § 3 ¶ 52. 
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been raised to the remedy hammered out in a non-PIL class action case: Urgenda.472 
Certain authors have deemed these types of remedies a form of judicial activism that 
contradicts the doctrine of the separation of powers.473 And yet, none of the previous 
arguments appear decisive. With regard to bureaucratic efficiency and trust, such 
programs may indeed offer public authorities an opportunity to improve 
competencies and accountability. With regard to judicial oversight, courts, as 
demonstrated in Leghari, are generally able to determine when oversight is not 
needed, or is no longer feasible. By that time, public authorities may have already 
learned how to cooperate with one another, which may be one of the most relevant 
hurdles to complex adaptation measures. On the separation of powers principle, two 
concluding remarks are in order. As foreshadowed by Montesquieu and the founding 
fathers of the United States, a democratic judiciary is in principle the weakest of all 
three branches of government,474 lacking “influence over either the sword or the 
purse.”475 For this lack of budgetary and coercive power—and because, by 
profession, they refrain from being an interested party—courts are likely the “least 
dangerous” to the political rights of a constitution.476 Accordingly, the previous case 
study offers a glimpse into why and how courts shall be in charge of effective judicial 
review. 
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